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This dissertation presents three essays on Shari’ah1 Compliant Equities. The 
reported work analyses the impact of Shari’ah Compliant Requirements (SCR) on 
the capital structure of the firms and its effect on cost of equity capital, payout 
policy and mitigation of firm level political risk.  
The first study examines if adoption of SCR affects the cost of equity capital 
for firms. It estimates the cost of equity capital, implied by market prices and 
analyst forecasts and account for changes in growth expectations around adoption of 
SCR. Results of the study show that transitional implications of Shari’ah 
compliance can diverge depending on information spread. The findings reveal that 
getting a Shari’ah compliance certificate, initially increases the cost of equity for a 
firm, potentially due to higher financial constraints and other burdens associated 
with Shari’ah requirements. However, with greater exposure and awareness in 
Islamic markets, Shari’ah compliance eventually leads to a fall in the cost of equity. 
The industry-level, SCR adoption effects are stronger in relatively tangible sectors. 
Robustness analyses confirm that becoming Shari’ah compliant increases the stock 
liquidity of SCR adopted firms, which co-varies negatively with the cost of equity. 
The second study examines if and to what extent adoption of SCR affects 
the payout smoothing policy of firms. More importantly, this study aims to identify 
and assess a possible mechanism behind such linkage and measure the amount of 
fluctuations of earnings absorbed by investment, borrowings and payout policies. 
Variance decomposition strategy that enables to empirically analyse the adjustments 
of borrowings and investment policies to comply with payout smoothing in order to 
                                                                                 
1 The set of sources of the sacred law of Islam, governing all aspects of Muslim life. 
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buffer net income fluctuations in the environment of Shari’ah compliance is 
employed. Using a new approach in the literature, this chapter measures the extent 
of intertemporal payout smoothing across business cycles to test the permanent 
income hypothesis for firms. Accordingly, the impacts of temporary vs. permanent 
net income shocks on the payout policy of firms are distinguished. The study also, 
documents that even though their payout ratios are mostly independent from the 
year by year net income growth (temporary shocks), dividends are impacted deeply 
by long term net income growth (permanent shocks). Interestingly, being Shari’ah 
compliant makes dividends more dependent on permanent income growth. 
The third study, using a novel Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) firm-
level political risk index as a proxy for political risk and uncertainty firms face, 
examines the impact of firm-level risk on the cost of equity and dividend payouts 
policy of firms. The paper aims to shed light on transitional implications of Shari’ah 
compliance on firms exposed to firm-level political risk. It analyses if adoption of 
SCR mitigates the firm-level political risk and their impact on cost of equity and 
dividend policy. Benchmark results show that 1% increase in the exposure of 
political risk contributes to a rise in its cost of equity capital by 0.2% and in 
dividend payout by 13%. Shari’ah compliance eventually leads to a fall in the cost 
of equity and a rise in dividend payouts, despite exposure of the firm to political 
risk. These findings have important policy implications that are relevant to Shari’ah 
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CHAPTER ONE: MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW 
 
This chapter presents the overall motivations and objectives of the thesis 
as well as briefly overviews the three essays individually, including main 
findings and contributions. The chapter concludes with an outline of the thesis 
structure. 
Islamic financial products are aimed at investors who want to comply 
with the Shari’ah requirements. Shari’ah compliant assets have become popular 
not only in Muslim-majority countries, but also have been trading in Europe and 
the United States. Since its inception three decades ago, the Islamic finance 
industry has expanded rapidly, especially over the past decade, growing 
annually at 15% in average (El Qorchi, 2005). Today, Shari’ah-compliant 
financial assets are estimated at roughly 2 trillion USD, covering bank and non-
bank financial institutions, capital markets, money markets, and insurance 
(“Takaful”) (IFSB – Islamic Financial Services Board, 2016). This growth has 
been fuelled by the large savings accumulated by many oil-exporting countries 
that are seeking to invest in Shari’ah compliant financial products. The market 
size of Islamic finance assets is expected to be 3.4 trillion USD by the end of 
2018 (Naveed, 2016). Shari’ah-compliant stocks constitute 36% of the assets of 
Islamic funds (IFSB 2016). 
Among Shari’ah compliant stocks, one of the specialized financial 
instruments are tradable stocks, which function in accordance with the Shari’ah 
investment requirements. It is claimed that the adoption of Shari’ah Compliant 
Requirements (SCR) can potentially lead to a number of significant capital 
market benefits. Firstly, it can facilitate a firm’s access to the savings of 
religious sensitive investors and channel those savings to productive 
investments. Given the large population of religiously sensitive investors from 
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the Muslim world2, the amount of their savings becomes very impressive. 
Making possible investment of these funds in a country’s firms could improve 
the liquidity of the capital markets and enlarge the firm investor base, which in 
turn improves risk sharing and lowers the cost of capital as stated in Merton 
(1987).  Secondly, Islamic finance makes a firm inherently less prone to 
financial distress, since its risk-sharing feature reduces firm leverage, which is 
one of the requirements of being Shari’ah compliant, encourages better risk 
management and is founded on strong ethical precepts (Kammer, Norat, Pinon, 
Prasad, Towe & Zeidane, 2015).  
SCR are set by AAOIFI-Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions a not-for-profit organization, which maintains and 
promotes Shari’ah standards for Islamic financial institutions, participants and 
the overall industry. Different organisations apply their screening policies based 
on AAOIFI standards3. The SCR adoption process requires firms to meet certain 
conditions such as keeping particular financial ratios within specific limits. 
According to the Dow Jones Islamic Market Indices4 Methodology (2016), 
acceptable debt-to-asset5, liquid assets-to-total assets6 and receivables-to-assets 
ratios7 are mandated to remain less or equal to 33%8. These conditions that lead 
to a change in the capital structure of a firm may alter the cost of equity. On the 
other hand, as already listed companies become Shari’ah compliant there is no 
                                                                                 
21.6 billion Muslims around the world, which is about 23% of the world's population (Global Religious Landscape Report, 
December, 2012) 
3For the sake of simplicity, we did not mention all the requirements of AAOIFI. For the full content of the standard please 
see http://aaoifi.com/?lang=en 
4 There are several studies e.g. Dawood, A  (2016), which compared all the Islamic Equity Indices. Due to format of the 
thesis and for the sake of brevity we did not briefly discuss about these indices in the thesis. 
5 Calculated as Total Debt divided by Trailing Twelve Month Average Market Capitalization (TTMAMC). 
6 Sum of cash and interest-bearing securities divided by TTMAMC. 
7Sum of current receivables and long-term receivables. 
8In addition to financial ratio restrictions, the DJIMI (Dow Jones Islamic Market Index) Shari’ah Supervisory Board 
established some broad categories of industries such as alcohol, pork related products, conventional financial services 
(banking, insurance, etc.), entertainment (hotels, casinos/gambling, cinema, pornography, music, etc.), tobacco, and 
weapons and defence as inconsistent with Shari’ah precepts (Dow Jones, 2016). SCR adopted firms should meet al. of the 
restrictions of Shari’ah law and the principles articulated for Islamic Finance and firms whose activities are not contrary to 
the above mentioned Shari’ah principles will be classified as Shari’ah-compliant securities. 
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extra cost to shareholders. Another argument is that not only religious sensitive 
but also other investors can buy these shares at no extra costs. In addition, prior 
analytical and empirical studies suggest that becoming Shari’ah compliant may 
serve as liquidity-enhancing policy, which provides greater float, since it can 
decrease illiquidity by improving investors’ diversification opportunities 
(Amihud & Mendelson, 1988). Taking into account these special conditions 
applied to Shari’ah compliant firms, the analysis of implications on firm 
behaviour needs a special approach, empirical data and modelling methodology.  
Chapter two links SCR and cost of equity capital. The multivariate 
framework enables us to analyze the effects of becoming Shari’ah compliant on 
the cost of equity capital while controlling the impact of other determinants 
such as leverage, firm size and return volatility, which adds to both Islamic 
finance and cost of capital literature. To the best of our knowledge, no study 
has asked this research question.  
We document a significant negative relationship between adoption of 
SCR and cost of equity. This result relates to investor recognition hypothesis 
suggesting that the improvement of the liquidity of the capital markets and 
enlargement of the firm investor base improves risk sharing and lowers the cost 
of capital as stated in Merton (1987). Our estimations also include business 
sector-specific effects to account for the industrial patterns reflecting in the cost 
of equity after SCR adoption. 
This study attempts to complement the literature in several ways. The 
ultimate purpose of our research is to model and investigate the changes in the 
cost of equity capital after voluntary adoption of SCR. Furthermore, our study 
also aims to identify and assess a possible mechanism behind such linkage and 
investigates the impact of other determinants in the model of cost of equity, 
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such as leverage, firm size and return volatility. 
In chapter three, we extend the literature on corporate payout by 
applying a variance decomposition methodology to evaluate the financial 
adjustments of Shari’ah compliant firms make in response to changes in 
earnings. Our study was motivated by the proposition that adoption of Shari’ah 
compliance points to general advantages. A lower-risk environment with lower 
leverage and other screening measures are among these advantages. Based on 
the strategies proposed by literature, we decompose the variance in net income 
to quantify the amount of fluctuations to earnings absorbed by investment, debt 
and payout. 
Our results are consistent with the Lambrecht & Myers (2012) budget 
constraint theory that identifies debt and investment as the main mechanisms to 
smooth volatility in net income. When the model is checked to account for a 
time trend, we find that Shari’ah compliance will eventually lead to a fall in the 
portion of debt and rise in the portion of payout in smoothing income, 
potentially due to higher financial constraints and other burdens associated 
with Shari’ah requirements. 
We further analyzed a complete assessment of payout smoothing by a 
joint examination of risk sharing and intertemporal smoothing hypotheses. 
Payout and long-term income growth correlation has become increasingly 
significant even more when the firms become Shari’ah compliant. This is quite 
intuitive since the firms would like to become less risky as they have limited 
ability to borrow loans and financial distress is avoidable. Secondly, they are 
not able to finance payout through extra debt after becoming Shari’ah 
compliant. Lastly, consonant with Darling (1957) and lending support to the 
permanent income hypothesis, payouts would not be decided on short-term 
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income flows but in line with long term income growth. Last but not least, 
aggregate income growth among firms is also correlated with payout growth.   
In chapter four, we extend the literature on political risk by using a novel 
dataset to evaluate the impact of firm level political risk on implied cost of equity 
and dividend payout policy of firms. Our estimations also include Shari’ah dummy 
variable to account for Shari’ah compliance-specific patterns being reflected in the 
mitigating the firm level political risk. 
Our benchmark results show that 1% increase in the exposure of political 
risk contributes to a rise in its cost of equity capital by 0.2% and in dividend payout 
by 13%. Consistent with the literature, this is due to investors in stock markets 
requiring a premium to compensate them for bearing additional political risk 
(Belkhir, Boubakri & Grira, 2017; Pastor & Veronesi, 2013) and firms facing firm-
level uncertainty try to send positive signal to the markets Huang et al. (2015). When 
the both models are checked to account for Shari’ah compliance, we find that 
Shari’ah compliance will eventually lead to a fall in cost of equity and rise in 
dividend payouts despite exposure of the firm to political risk.  
We further augmented our models with two-stage regression by including 
some instrumental variables in order to remedy endogeneity. Implied cost of equity 
2SLS models reveal similar coefficients and signs of all variables. However, in 
dividend payout 2SLS models the political risk variable shows negative and 
significant coefficient (-0.52), pointing on to effects of the PRISK eventually leads 
to a fall in dividend payouts when the firm exposure to firm-level political risk. 
The main part of this dissertation embraces three essays, each building upon 
the behavior of Shari’ah compliant firms. In order to organize the dissertation in a 
methodical manner, the three essays will appear as three independent chapters. 
Specifically, the structure of this dissertation is briefly described as follows.  
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Chapter two theoretically and empirically examines the link between SCR 
and cost of equity. The analysis focuses on the cost of equity capital, implied by 
market prices and analyst forecasts and account for changes in growth expectations 
around adoption of. The ultimate aim of chapter three is to model and analyze the 
changes in payout smoothing policy of a firm after becoming Shari’ah 
compliant. Chapter four provides a novel approach to shed light on recent 
Islamic equity developments and political risk. Chapter five concludes and 




CHAPTER TWO: SHARI’AH COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS 




As explained earlier, the SCR adoption process requires firms to meet 
certain conditions such as keeping particular financial ratios within specific 
limits such as acceptable debt-to-asset9, liquid assets-to-total assets10 and 
receivables-to-assets ratios11 are mandated to remain less or equal to 33%12. 
These conditions that lead to a change in the capital structure of a firm may 
alter the cost of equity. On the other hand, as already listed companies become 
Shari’ah compliant, there is no extra cost to shareholders. Another argument is 
that not only religious sensitive but also other investors can buy these shares at 
no extra costs. In addition, prior analytical and empirical studies suggest that 
becoming Shari’ah compliant may serve as liquidity-enhancing policy, which 
provides greater float, since it can decrease illiquidity by improving investors’ 
diversification opportunities (Amihud & Mendelson, 1988; Abbes & Trichilli, 
2015; Brière, Oosterlinck, & Szafarz, 2015). Taking into account these special 
conditions applied to Shari’ah compliant firms, the analysis of implications on 
firm behavior needs a special approach, empirical data and modelling 
methodology.  
Extant research analyze behavior of Shari’ah compliant stocks and their 
co-movement with Sukuks (Aloui, Hammoudeh & Hamida, 2015), risk and 
                                                                                 
9 Calculated as Total Debt divided by Trailing Twelve Month Average Market Capitalization (TTMAMC). 
10 Sum of cash and interest-bearing securities divided by TTMAMC. 
11Sum of current receivables and long-term receivables. 
12In addition to financial ratio restrictions, the DJIMI (Dow Jones Islamic Market Index) Shari’ah Supervisory Board 
established some broad categories of industries such as alcohol, pork related products, conventional financial services 
(banking, insurance, etc.), entertainment (hotels, casinos/gambling, cinema, pornography, music, etc.), tobacco, and 
weapons and defence as inconsistent with Shari’ah precepts (Dow Jones, 2016). SCR adopted firms should meet al. of 
the restrictions of Shari’ah law and the principles articulated for Islamic Finance and firms whose activities are not 




returns (Hanif, Shah & Iqbal, 2015; Narayan, Phan, Sharma, & Westerlund, 
2016 and Akhtar, Jahromi, & Smith, 2017) and firm performance (Girard & 
Hassan, 2008; Walkshäusl & Lobe, 2012 and Reddy & Fu, 2014). However, 
the argument whether and to what extent adoption of SCR affects the cost of 
equity of a firm, remains an open question. Understanding this relationship is 
becoming increasingly important for the decision making of firms, since the 
cost of equity is a crucial element in their future investment decisions. While 
the volume of Islamic finance is increasing and poses important managerial 
questions on the issue of the adoption of SCR, there is no detailed empirical 
research that analyses the effect of the SCR adoption on firm capital structure 
and in turn, cost of equity. Becoming Shari’ah compliant might increase the 
exposure by religious sensitive investors, which results in upward change in 
liquidity. We also suspect there is a structural break at the time firms become 
Shari’ah compliant, thus altering firm capital structure and cost of equity.  
In the context of these critical managerial and policy questions, the 
present study attempts to complement the literature in several ways. The 
ultimate purpose of our research is to model and investigate the changes in the 
cost of equity capital after voluntary adoption of SCR. The bonding argument 
suggests that the cost of equity is altered congruent with: changes in firm risks; 
inclusion to the stock listings (Karolyi, 1998); greater information disclosure 
and transparency due to the compliance to particular standards (Daske, Hail, 
Leuz, & Verdi, 2008; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991); signaling to investors and 
rise in their recognition of a firm that leads to increase in investor base as well 
as liquidity (Merton, 1987; Hail & Leuz, 2009). Another argument is that 
Shari’ah compliance can make it less costly for investors to analyze and 
compare firms across regions, facilitate cross-border investments and improve 
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risk sharing - all of which could reduce the cost of equity capital. Consistent 
with these premises, we are particularly interested in whether adoption of SCR 
triggers significant changes in external finance and liquidity of firms, 
contributing to a decline in the cost of equity capital13. Furthermore, our study 
also aims to identify and assess a possible mechanism behind such linkage and 
investigates the impact of other determinants in the model of cost of equity, 
such as leverage, firm size and return volatility. Our estimations include 
business sector-specific effects to account for the industrial patterns reflected in 
the cost of equity after SCR adoption. Based on theoretical propositions, we 
therefore, expect that adoption of SCR increases firm market liquidity - 
attracting new investors, hence decreasing the cost of equity. 
To estimate the effects, we employ a two steps empirical strategy. We 
begin our analysis with ex ante estimates of firm cost of equity capital, implied 
by market prices and analyst forecasts. This approach explicitly accounts for 
changes in the market’s growth expectations around adoption of SCR. It also 
allows us to evaluate the magnitude of both growth and cost of equity effects 
on firm valuations. Next, we run firm-level panel regressions that control for 
time-varying firm characteristics, and firm-fixed effects. Our analysis is based 
on a comprehensive panel sample of 6435 firm-year observations classified 
into nine industries over the period of 2006-2016. To our knowledge, our study 
is the first to examine this relationship of adoption of SCR and cost of equity in 
Islamic investment markets. 
Our empirical results are consistent with the investor recognition 
hypothesis (Merton, 1987) and reveal that adoption of SCR significantly 
reduces the cost of equity capital of firms. However, the magnitude of the 
                                                                                 
13 In contrast, firms adopting SCR may be subject to boycotts by non-Muslim consumers and investors. In this case, we 
may see increase in cost of equity. 
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effect may vary by sectors and possibly, firm size. Overall, Shari’ah 
compliance provides more liquidity with its strict requirement on the leverage 
rate (not surpassing 33%), simultaneously might reduce the cost of equity. We 
also provide policy recommendations based on our empirical results.  
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents a 
brief literature review; section 2.3 discusses the methodology and outlines the 
estimation model. The empirical estimation with findings and insights are 
presented in section 2.4. Lastly, section 2.5 concludes by summarizing the 
findings and discussing them with policy implications.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
 
2.2.1 Capital Structure effects on cost of equity 
 
Traditionally, a firm should minimize its weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) and maximize the value of its marketable assets. This 
approach suggests that the use of debt financing has a clear and identifiable 
limit. Any debt capital beyond that point will create company devaluation and 
unnecessary leverage.  
Modigliani & Miller (1958) were the first to landmark the topic of 
capital structure in modern finance. In principle, under the idealistic 
assumptions of Modigliani and Miller’s irrelevancy theory, changes in capital 
structure should have no impact on overall WACC. They argue that the type of 
instrument used to finance an investment is irrelevant for a company in judging 
the profitability of an investment project. Thus, a firm's capital structure, i.e., 
how its assets are financed, is irrelevant in determining firm value and its future 
performance. However, when deductibility of interest payments from 
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corporate-tax liabilities considered, Miller & Modigliani (1958) also concluded 
that use of borrowed funds reduces cost of capital of the firms. Moreover, 
William & Burton (1967) suggest that when realistic transactions costs are 
considered, leverage is likely to decrease the cost of capital over certain ranges 
of leverage. So, theoretically, any firm that decreases the leverage increases the 
weighted cost of capital of the firm. Thus, AAOIFI requirements actually 
increases the cost of capital as it limits firms to access debt which is cheaper 
than equity.  However, we argue that WACC decreases as cost of equity 
decrease due to high demand for the Shari’ah compliant equities as liquidity is 
reverse related with cost of equity. 
Since Modigliani and Miller, many studies have examined the 
“irrelevance theory” of capital structure. Robichek & Myers (1966) and Kraus 
& Litzenberger (1973) conclude that when reliance on the financial debt is 
small, the tax-shelter effect dominates, but as soon as leverage increases too 
much, risk of ruin prevails. This is because shareholders view higher leverage 
as risky and demand a higher return on equity, thus raising the total cost of 
capital. Furthermore, Miller (1977) introduce the effect of personal taxes to the 
Modigliani and Miller model arguing that the optimal capital structure is 
simply a matter of rebalancing tax advantages against bankruptcy costs. 
DeAngelo & Masulis (1980) argue that Miller’s theorem is extremely sensitive 
to the realistic and simple modifications in the corporate tax code. They show 
there is a market equilibrium, where every firm has a unique optimal capital 
structure by including into the analysis a tax shield that is not a result of the 
interest costs (e.g. accounting depreciation, depletion allowance, and 
investment tax credits). 
Other capital structure theories have emerged over the past years. These 
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include the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory and market timing theory. 
According to the trade-off theory, there is an optimal capital structure of a firm. 
This optimal capital structure is a mix of financing that equates the marginal 
costs to marginal benefits of debt financing (Lemmon & Zender, 2010).  The 
pecking order theory, however, states that there is no optimal capital structure, 
but rather firms choose capital according to the preference of internal finance, 
debt then equity (Chen & Chen, 2011). In other words, firms trade off the costs 
and benefits associated with debt and equity by finding an optimal capital 
structure after accounting for market imperfections and will source funds 
following a preference order of internal funds, debt and then equity (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). Frank & Goyal (2009) summarized market timing theory as 
management analyzing the current market conditions in debt and equity 
markets. When a firm needs new financing, management uses the type of 
financing which is more favorable at the moment. If neither of them looks 
favorable, management can defer the issuances. On the other hand, if current 
conditions look unusually favorable, funds may be raised even if the firm 
currently does not need new funds.  
Despite the proposed theories on leverage neutrality on cost of equity, 
the existence of market imperfections has led financial theorists to agree that an 
optimal capital structure does exist for each firm (e.g. Flannery & Rangan, 
2006). Firms decision to determine the source of funds (debt, equity or a 
combination of both) to finance assets, operations and growth of the firms 
depends on several factors. Business risk, tax exposure, market conditions, the 
firm’s growth rate and the cost of capital are examples for these factors (Huang 
& Song, 2006). Another important firm characteristic found in the literature is 
future growth opportunities. Firms with high future growth opportunities are 
 
13 
expected to use more equity financing because a highly leveraged company 
may forgo profitable investment opportunities when it expects by undertaking 
new project, the value goes to the firm’s existing debt holders (Myers, 1977). 
This suggests negative relationship between leverage and growth. This view is 
supported by Smith & Watts (1992), Rajan & Zingales (1995) and Akhtar & 
Oliver (2009). In short, various currently held theories make very different 
predictions as to the relationships between capital structure and the valuation of 
the firm and its individual securities. 
Furthermore, studies highlight that ability of disclosure to affect equity 
costs, reduces information asymmetries and change investor preferences 
(Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). From this point of view, disclosure of 
information allows companies to reduce information asymmetries in capital 
markets, increasing stock liquidity and decreasing, in turn, cost of equity 
(Amihud & Mendelson, 1988; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). 
From an Islamic finance perspective, there are certain limitations to a 
debt level of a firm. Shari’ah compliant equities should pass financial ratio 
screens with regard to high leverage, cash and interest-bearing securities and 
accounts receivables. Therefore, they should meet a Shari’ah screening 
threshold of 33% on leverage if they want to adopt SCR (Khatkhatay & Nisar, 
2007). So, what is the effect of this on firm’s value as any changes made in the 
level of debt or equity will modify the firm’s value? Trade-off theories of 
corporate financing help approach to this question as they are built around the 
concept of target capital structure that balances various costs and benefits of 
debt and equity. These include the tax benefits of debt and the costs of financial 
distress (Modigliani & Miller, 1963), various agency costs of debt and equity 
financing (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Stulz, 1990; Hart & 
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Moore, 1994), and the costs and benefits of signaling with capital structure 
(Ross, 1977).  
 
2.2.2 Liquidity effects on cost of equity 
 
Although in the theory, the main determinant of the cost of equity is the 
firm’s capital structure, several recent studies point that liquidity and structural 
breaks, caused by adopting SCR, may also play a critical role. Becker-Blease & 
Paul (2006) examine the relationship between increased stock liquidity 
following S&P 500 Index inclusion and expansion of the investment 
opportunity set and argue that if stock liquidity increases, then the cost of 
equity and, subsequently, the overall cost of capital for the firm decreases. 
Diamond & Verrecchia (1991) analyzed the causes and consequences of a 
security's liquidity, especially the effect of future liquidity on the security's 
current price. They found that attracting increased demand from large investors 
due to increased liquidity of firms’ securities can reduce a firm's cost of capital.  
Although there is no particular study that documents increase of the 
investor base of a firm by becoming Shari’ah compliant, there are several 
studies that have examined religion’s influence upon people’s financial 
behavior and investment decisions (Anand & Cowton, 1993; Keister, 2003; 
Lehrer, 2004; Renneboog, Ter Horst & Zhang 2011). Anand & Cowton (1993) 
documented that there is evidence of a growing number of investors who wish 
to incorporate moral or social concerns in their decision-making. Literature also 
documents that religious sensitive investors might derive utility from investing 
within the restrictions of their faith and value the Shari’ah Compliant shares 
(Renneboog, Ter Horst, & Zhang 2011). Tahir & Brimble (2011) examined 
what drives investment decisions by Muslims and whether or not Muslim 
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investment behavior is more in accordance with Islamic culture or the 
assumptions underlying modern portfolio theory. They found that investment 
behavior is more associated with Islamic culture, in respect of religious 
sensitive Muslims. Thus, being Shari’ah compliant should be associated with 
increase in purchase intention of religious sensitive investors, as adopting SCR 
triggers enhanced investor recognition and enlarges firms’ investor base, which 
in turn increase market liquidity of the firm, whereby liquidity is reverse 
correlated with cost of equity, as stated in Merton (1987). This effect of being 
Shari’ah compliant may reduce risk premium as stated in Foerster & Karolyi 
(1999). In line to this, Luo, Wang, Raithel, & Zheng (2015) found that firms 
carrying out Corporate Social Responsibility, which is similar in a way to SCR 
adoption, engagement are more likely to attract shareholders to buy their stocks 
and consequently reduce their cost of equity.  
Another argument is that adoption of SCR may cause structural breaks 
and this structural break may change the cost of equity of the firm. There are 
mixed results regarding amount and direction of the change in the cost of 
equity after structural breaks. Daske et al. (2008) analyzed the impact of 
adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on firms’ cost of 
equity and found that there was an increase in the cost of equity due to the 
change in accounting rules. Similarly, Richardson & Welker (2001) find that 
corporate social disclosure – a company’s public revelation of its Corporate 
Social Responsibility engagement – is positively related to cost of equity. 
Contrary to expectations, they find that there is a significant positive relation 
between social disclosures and the cost of equity capital. They also consider 
some biases in social disclosures that may explain this result. However, Bekaert 
& Harvey (2000) report break points and documented that liquidity contributes 
 
16 
to the decline in the cost of capital post-liberalization in the emerging markets. 
They attempt to observe a shift in the cost of capital by examining the behavior 
of equity returns, namely dividend yields. 
In particular, the traditional finance literature has little to say about 
empirical implications of SCR. The existing research literature pertaining 
Shari’ah compliant stocks is still embryonic, despite their increasing popularity. 
Early research by Naughton & Naughton (2000), examine the instruments 
traded and the structure and practices of stock markets from an Islamic 
perspective by reviewing a range of issues relating to the potential for a 
separate Islamic securities exchange. Study by Hakim & Rashidian (2004) is 
more related to Islamic stock indices, where they analyzed beta of Dow Jones 
Islamic (DJI) using the CAPM as a theoretical basis. Another study by Chen & 
Ngo (2017) analyze the effects of inclusion and exclusion of stock into DJI and 
found that firms added to the DJI experience significant positive excess returns 
in both the short window and long window upon the announcements, whereas 
deleted firms experience significant negative excess returns. Added firms enjoy 
significant increases in liquidity and deleted firms suffer from decreases in 
liquidity. They also document a decrease in the cost of equity and an increase 




2.3 Methodology and Empirical Analysis 
 
In order to construct the model of the cost of equity and Shari’ah 
compliance nexus, we start our analyses by estimating the cost of equity. Cost 
of equity measurement is extensively discussed in the literature. It can be 
calculated with the use of realized returns in an asset pricing model and/or be 
implied using expected cash flows and earnings. While the accounting, finance 
and economics literature have suggested a wide range of procedures to estimate 
a firm’s cost of equity capital, traditional state-of-the-art methods, such as the 
CAPM have produced disappointing empirical results (Fama & French, 1997; 
2004) and are questionable in that they use average realized returns instead of 
measures of expected returns (Elton, 1999). Thus, we use the ex-ante cost of 
equity implied in current stock prices and analyst forecasts of future earnings. 
This implied cost of equity measure is more suitable in this research setting 
compared to the alternatives as it estimates expected returns directly from stock 
prices and cash flow forecasts without relying on biased realized returns or on 
asset pricing models (Hou, van Dijk, & Zhang, 2012). This section sheds light 
on the estimation methods and techniques. 
 
2.3.1 Estimating the Implied Cost of Equity Capital 
 
The implied cost of equity is the discount rate that sets the current stock 
price equal to the present value of expected future dividends per share. The 
relation between the current stock price , the cost of equity (r), and future 
expected dividends per share ( ) is represented by the dividend 




  (1) 
2.3.1.1 Gordon Dividend Growth Model 
 
The Gordon Dividend Growth Model, the simplest form of the DDM, 
assumes a constant perpetual rate of growth (g) in expected dividends per 
share, and the cost of equity can be written as follows: 
 
   (2) 
 
2.3.1.2. Abnormal Earnings Growth Models 
 
Abnormal Earnings Growth Models assume that the change in abnormal 
earnings from year to year grows at a constant rate into perpetuity. Gode & 
Mohanram (2003) implement the theoretical model of Ohlson & Juettner-
Nauroth (2005) by assuming that the short-term growth rate ( ) is equal to the 
average of the forecasted growth rate between year one and year two and the 
average five-year growth rate provided by analysts. Furthermore, they assume 
that the long-term growth rate ( ) is equal to expected inflation for all firms. 
The cost of equity can be obtained from the following relation between price, 
and the next year’s earnings per share estimate ( ) and expected dividends 
per share ( : 
 
   (3) 
 
 
Another Abnormal Earnings Growth model is Easton’s (2004) 
Modified-PEG ratio model. It is also a modified version of the Ohlson & 
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Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model, where the growth rate in the change in 
dividends is set equal to zero (  = 0) so that dividends grow by the same 
amount every year into perpetuity. The current stock price is related to the cost 
of equity, the next two year’s forecasted earnings, as well as the next year’s 
dividend. 
 
  (4) 
 
Although, there are other many different implied costs of capital 
estimates in the literature, lack of a comparative evaluation of these methods 
makes it impossible to choose among the alternative implied estimates. Our 
analysis focuses on these two Abnormal Earnings Growth Models. Following 
Hail & Leuz (2006), we average over the two proxies, cost of equity (COE) 
obtained from equations 3 and 4 and use the resulting mean estimate as our 
primary dependent variable COE.  
 
2.3.2 Data and the Estimation Model 
 
In order to document the change of the cost of equity around the SCR 
adoption we target firms that adopted SCR recently. In other words, the 
selected firms were not Shari’ah compliant initially (conventional equities) and 
were accepted as Shari’ah compliant at some stage of their activity and 
remained to be Shari’ah over the sample period of time. As of December 2016, 
we find a total of 584 SCR adopted US firms, identified by Ideal Ratings14, 
                                                                                 
14 Ideal Ratings is an asset management firm and covers a universe of 40,000+ equities globally. Its services have been 
reviewed and approved by several Shariah scholars and advisors globally as the service has been designed to support in 
making investment decisions by screening and managing the compliance cycle for Shariah compliant products, such as 
equities, funds, EITs and indexes. They do this mainly for selling data and different Islamic funds buy data from them. 
Please refer to Ho, CSF (2015) for detailed discussion of the roles and functions of independent companies such as Ideal 
Ratings that provide data on Shari'ah-compliant firms 
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consistent with their business and financial screenings, which are broadly based 
on the AAOIFI standards. The firms in our sample became Shari’ah compliant 
as of 1st of January 2011 and this gives us opportunity to analyze post adoption 
cost of equity changes. To estimate the cost of equity, we obtain financial data 
from Worldscope and analyst forecasts and share price information from the 
I/B/E/S over the period 2006-2016.  
We further classify these equities according to the sectoral 
characteristics of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) to analyze 
whether or not there are significant differences across the sectors. The SIC 
classifies a system of 10 industries namely - Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; 
Mining, Construction; Manufacturing; Transportation, Communications, 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary service; Wholesale Trade; Retail Trade; Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate; Services and Public Administration. Table 1 






















Table 1. Industrial Classification of Firms 

























Notes: Firms are classified according to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). Division J is omitted from analysis due 
to absence of data. 
 
 
2.3.3 Empirical Analysis 
 
We start our analysis by estimating the implied cost of equity for each 
individual firm over each year of our sample (2006-2016), using firm level 
data. We use a panel regression analysis to identify the effects of various firm-
level and dummy variables on the cost of equity for our sample of firms. To 
examine the main determinants for the change of the cost of equity and to 
analyze impact of adopting SCR on cost of equity around SCR adoption, we 
include the cost of equity as the dependent variable and perform regression 
analyses.  
Following the Hail & Leuz (2006) strategy and extending it further by 
including dummy variables to control effects of Global Financial Crisis and 
adoption of SCR and a variable to capture the trend in time, we estimate the 





Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing A 3 
Mining B 48 
Construction C 8 
Manufacturing D 288 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and 
Sanitary service 
E 65 
Wholesale Trade F 28 
Retail Trade G 61 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate H 3 
Services I 81 
Public Administration J 0 





Where  is the average estimates from the implied cost of equity 
capital models, proposed by Gode and Mohanram (2003) and Easton (2004), 
 is natural logarithm of total assets of the firm, return 
variability measured as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the 
last 12 months,  is a control variable for forecast bias and measured 
using the one-year-ahead forecast error (forecasts minus actual values) scaled 
by total assets,  is inflation rate for the year, is financial 
leverage of the firm and measured as total liabilities divided by total assets at 
the end of the year,  is dummy variable, takes the value of 1 for the year 
of the Global Financial Crisis 2008 and 0 otherwise,  is a variable 
taking values from 1 to 11 assigned for each year to capture the trend in time as 
stated in Balli, Balli, & Louis, 2013,  is dummy variable equal to 1 if 
an observation is SCR adopted, and 0 non-adopted,  is error term. 
Descriptive statistical properties for the implied cost of equity estimates and 
control variables are given in table 2. Estimated cost of equity by implied 
method as explained above reveals the mean of 0.15 with standard deviation 
0.08. We can see more considerable variability in the size of firms in our 
sample, that show relatively high standard deviation of around 1.63. The same 
applies to the leverage, whereby some firms have higher ratios of 0.92 
(applicable for the periods when these firms had not adopted SCR yet), while 
some other firms hold their leverage as low as zero. All variables are positively 
skewed except , which is skewed to the left.  All variables except 




















Notes: The sample comprises 6435 firm-year observations from 9 sectors between 2006 and 2016 for which sufficient 
Worldscope financial data, I/B/E/S forecast, and pricing data exist. COE is the average cost of capital estimate implied by 
the mean analyst consensus forecasts and stock prices using equations (3) and (4). SIZE is natural logarithm of total assets 
of the firm. RVAR is the return variability computed as annual standard deviation of monthly stock returns. FBIAS equals 
the IBES analyst forecast error (mean forecast for the next fiscal year minus actual earnings) scaled by total assets. Inflation 
is inflation rate for the year. LEV is financial leverage of the firm and measured as total liabilities divided by total assets at 
the end of the year. 
 
Table 3 displays correlation matrix of the variables. It is seen that 
multicollinearity problem does not exist since results are in the range of 0.017 
and 0.451 of the correlation coefficients.  Consistent with the literature the 
variables reveal expected signs. With respect to COE SIZE and LEV have 










COE 5886 0.150 0.131 1.971 0.008 0.081 5.485 72.905 
SIZE 6424 14.608 14.484 19.816 9.569 1.638 0.357 2.840 
RVAR 6434 0.349 0.301 4.238 0.070 0.211 4.025 45.013 
LEVERAGE 6415 0.188 0.189 0.921 0.000 0.141 0.743 5.098 
FBIAS 6414 0.029 0.006 11.371 -5.458 0.280 24.319 868.460 




Table 3. Correlation of the variables. 
 
 COE Size RVAR LEV FBIAS Inflation 
COE 1.000 
     
SIZE -0.163*** 1.000 
    
RVAR 0.451*** -0.318*** 1.000 
   
LEVERAGE 0.013 0.335*** -0.030** 1.000 
  
FBIAS 0.050*** -0.044*** 0.131*** 0.031** 1.000 
 
INFLATION -0.071*** -0.045*** -0.020 -0.052*** 0.017 1.000 
 
Notes: The sample comprises 6435 firm-year observations from 9 sectors between 2006 and 2016 for which sufficient 
Worldscope financial data, I/B/E/S forecast, and pricing data exist. COE is the average cost of capital estimate implied 
by the mean analyst consensus forecasts and stock prices using equations (3) and (4). SIZE is natural logarithm of total 
assets of the firm. RVAR is the return variability computed as annual standard deviation of monthly stock returns. FBIAS 
equals the IBES analyst forecast error (mean forecast for the next fiscal year minus actual earnings) scaled by total assets. 
Inflation is inflation rate for the year. LEV is financial leverage of the firm and measured as total liabilities divided by 
total assets at the end of the year. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4 exhibits t-statistics for difference in means for each variable used 
for before and after adopting SCR. We find highly significant evidence for 
difference in means before and after adopting SCR for each characteristics of 
firms except the variable FBIAS. As expected, the mean of the cost of equity 
after being SC is less than before being SC. Surprisingly the mean of the 
leverage after 2011 is significantly higher than that before 2011. However, it is 











Table 4. T-statistics for difference in means (2006–2010) and (2011–2016). 
 
 Pre-SCR firm-years Post SCR firm-years t-Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  
        
COE 2644 0.156 0.081 3242 0.145 0.081 4.899*** 
SIZE 2923 14.404 1.630 3501 14.780 1.624 -9.216*** 
RVAR 2924 0.395 0.237 3510 0.311 0.178 16.161*** 
LEVERAGE 2914 0.167 0.123 3501 0.206 0.151 -11.267*** 
FBIAS 2915 0.031 0.336 3499 0.028 0.222 0.508 
INFLATION 2925 0.023 0.026 3510 0.016 0.011 12.896*** 
 
Notes: The sample comprises 6435 firm-year observations from 9 sectors between 2006 and 2016 for which sufficient 
Worldscope financial data, I/B/E/S forecast, and pricing data exist. COE is the average cost of capital estimate implied 
by the mean analyst consensus forecasts and stock prices using equations (3) and (4). SIZE is natural logarithm of total 
assets of the firm. RVAR is the return variability computed as annual standard deviation of monthly stock returns. FBIAS 
equals the IBES analyst forecast error (mean forecast for the next fiscal year minus actual earnings) scaled by total assets. 
Inflation is inflation rate for the year. LEV is financial leverage of the firm and measured as total liabilities divided by 
total assets at the end of the year. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
We also checked for the stationarity of the variables using Fisher type 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) (Dickey & Fuller, 1979) unit root tests. All 
variables came out to be stationary, implying there is no problem of unit root in 
the series.15 
 
2.4 Estimation Results and Discussions 
 
Table 5 displays the results in different model specifications estimated 
using the GLS (Generalized Least Squares) technique. Hausman test result 
indicated favor for the fixed effect over random effect test, which we applied in 
our regressions. The robust standard errors were also applied to avoid the 
problem of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the model.  
The first model specification represents the benchmark model, where 
we find the relationship of the stated variables excluding the Shari’ah 
compliance indicator. All the coefficients reveal theoretically expected signs, 
with mostly significant coefficients. The leverage variable exhibits positive and 
significant coefficient of 0.061, which validates its positive impact on the cost 
                                                                                 
15For the sake of brevity, we did not post the unit root test results. They are available upon request. 
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of equity. If leverage increases by 1%, the cost of equity increases by 0.061 
points. This might be associated with the perception of rising risk as financial 
leverage rises; higher risk triggers higher cost of equity for a firm. In the same 
vein, the return volatility variable ( ) with the highly significant 
coefficient of 0.107, is positively related to a rising cost of capital. In contrast, 
1 % increase in inflation seems to reduce the cost of equity capital by 0.359 
points, consistent with Khan & Rafiq (2013), who states that higher inflation 
generally increases the stock prices, thereby reducing the cost of equity. 
Concurrently, it is discussed that an increase in inflation causes earnings of the 
firm to increase, as a result the firm’s cost of equity declines. Lastly, 1 % 
increase in the firm SIZE contributes to a fall in its cost of equity capital by 
0.00029 points; larger firms could get more net benefit from higher disclosure 
compared to smaller firms due to economies of scale (lower relative costs to 
produce) and lower proprietary cost (Embong, Mohd-Saleh & Sabri, 2012).   
The second specification model captures the effect of a dichotomous 
break, represented by the Shari’ah variable. It reveals positive and significant 
coefficient, which indicates that after becoming Shari’ah compliant, a firm’s 
cost of equity capital rises on average by 0.006 points. This may be due to the 
reason mentioned in footnote 8. However, before making the general 
conclusion on the positive relationship between Shari’ah compliance and cost 
of equity, we augmented the model by including the trend function to account 
for the time pattern of the variable effects and the data in third model. The time 
trend function has been frequently ignored in the relevant literature, and yet, 
plays a crucial role. It is widely known that the models with the dichotomous 
break variables may reveal inaccurate estimation results due to the strong 
effects of the shock/break at the particular time, which is not spread over the 
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whole sample period. As such, when we deal with those models, we have good 
prior reason to suppose that a function is shifting over time, so we add time 
trend variable ( ) to assume the shift is the same in each year. Adding 
the trend in the models with structural breaks, allows the parameters to change 
with a constant value each year (Balli et al. 2013). The trend variable can also 
be a good proxy for unmeasurable factors and/or time effects that can 




Table 5. Multivariate regressions of cost of equity capital on SCR adoption 
and other determinants. 
 



































































SHARI’AH X TREND - - - 
-0.004*** 
(3.09) 
Obs. 5854 5854 5854 5854 
R2 12.89% 12.44% 13.27% 13.46% 
 
Notes: Coefficients estimations are made by Panel estimated GLS (FGLS). The equation is as below: 
 
where  is the average estimates from the implied cost of equity capital models, proposed by Gode & Mohanram 
(2003) and Easton (2004),  is natural logarithm of total assets of the firm, return variability measured 
as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the last 12 month,  is a control variable for forecast 
bias and measured as using the one-year-ahead forecast error (forecasts minus actual values), scaled by total assets, 
 inflation rate for the year, is financial leverage of the firm and measured as total liabilities divided by 
total assets at the end of the year,  is dummy variable, takes the value of 1 for the year of the Global Financial 
Crisis 2008 and 0 otherwise,  is a variable taking values from 1 to 11 assigned for each year to capture the trend 
in time as stated in Balli et al. (2013),  is dummy variable equal to 1 if an observation is SC adopted, and 0 
non-adopted,  is error term. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively and t 
statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
 
In our case, those factors can be identified as the shifts in investor 
expectations, information disclosure and market reactions caused by the news 
of becoming Shari’ah compliant. Therefore, including the time trend variable 
largely helps detect those unknown unmeasurable effects over time spread as 
well as other control variables in the model. Our trend variable is normalized to 
the value of 1 at the start of the period for each firm, ascending at a unit 
frequency for successive observations, and resets at the start of next firm. 
Despite the initial validation of the positive relationship between SCR 
and cost of equity, the fourth specification model reveals that the cost of equity 
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actually falls when the time trend is taken into account. The trended interaction 
variable of the Shari’ah compliance ( ) shows negative and 
significant coefficient, pointing on to long-term effects of the Shari’ah 
compliance announcement that eventually leads to a fall in cost of equity. It 
implies that it may take some time for the firms and markets to incorporate the 
relevant considerations associated with the SCR adoption news and adjust to 
reduce the cost of equity over time. Becoming Shari’ah compliant may trigger 
higher stress and financial constraints, which might increase cost of capital in 
the initial period, however, in the total time frame, cost of equity falls, possibly 
in correspondence with improved market information in the market. This effect 
is also explained in Daske et al. (2008). They suggest that structural shocks 
may initially raise the cost of equity due to some anticipation effects and 
concerns about first-time International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
interim reporting, press releases, and other disclosures ahead of the accounting 
change, all of which would likely accelerate capital market effects. However, 
when those effects were removed, the study observed that switching to IFRS 
actually lowered the cost of equity. By looking at the values of observed mean 
cost of equity, it can be suggested that although trivial, Shari’ah compliance is 
able to alter the values of cost of equity capital of a firm. As for other control 
variables, inclusion of trend variable does not notably alter their sign and 
significance. As expected GFC variable reveals negative significant coefficient 
in the model 4 and 5.  
Around 50% of our sample consist of the manufacturing firms (SICD). 
Thus, we run above mentioned regressions once more excluding SICD firm in 




Table 6. Multivariate regressions of cost of equity capital on SCR adoption 
and other determinants. Excluding manufacturing (SIC D) firms. 
 



































































SHARI’AH X TREND - - - 
-0.004** 
(-2.34) 
Obs. 2949 2949 2949 2949 
R2 15.91% 16.40% 17.46% 17.72% 
 
Notes: Coefficients estimations are made by Panel estimated GLS (FGLS). The equation is as below: 
 
where  is the average estimates from the implied cost of equity capital models, proposed by Gode & Mohanram 
(2003) and Easton (2004),  is natural logarithm of total assetsof the firm, return variability measured as 
the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the last 12 month,  is a control variable for forecast bias 
and measured as using the one-year-ahead forecast error (forecasts minus actual values), scaled by total assets, 
 inflation rate for the year, is financial leverage of the firm and measured as total liabilities divided by 
total assets at the end of the year,  is dummy variable, takes the value of 1 for the year of the Global Financial 
Crisis 2008 and 0 otherwise,  is a variable taking values from 1 to 11 assigned for each year to capture the trend 
in time as stated in Balli et al. (2013),  is dummy variable equal to 1 if an observation is SC adopted, and 0 
non-adopted,  is error term. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively and t 
statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
 
2.4.1 Industry Based Estimations 
 
We further differentiate equities into nine separate industries to detect 
specific sector-based effects after adopting Shari’ah requirements. In fact, there 
are ten sectors by Standard Industry Classification, however, for public 
administration sector we could not find SCR adopted firms, which became 
Shari’ah compliant at the same date as the whole sample. Therefore, we did not 
include this industry in our estimations.  
Table 7 displays industry-based estimation results with some interesting 
points to mention. For most of the sectors and  
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interaction variables have opposite signs, as explained above. They tend to 
reveal relatively significant coefficients in industries mostly with greater 
number of observations such as Manufacturing, Transportation / 
Communication / Utility Services, Retail Trade and Services industries. The 
trend interaction  is also significant for Financial Services 
sector, but in this case, it has a positive coefficient. This indicates that firms in 
this sector, does not experience a fall in the cost of their equities after 
becoming Shari’ah compliant. However, we should not ignore the fact that 
number of firms in our industry sample is considerably low, as well as the 
share of this industry in total economy, so the results may not reflect all the 





Table 7. Industrial Analysis 

























Mining -0.047*** 0.079** -0.025** -0.434 -0.003 0.143 0.080 0.003 -0.002 444 30% 
  (-3.78) (2.26) (-2.57) (-1.48) (-0.13) (1.29) (0.31) (0.67) (-0.06)     
Construction -0.069** 0.014 0.209* -0.877** -0.078*** 0.031 0.010** 0.006 -0.012* 85 35% 
  (-2.75) (0.53) (1.88) (-2.51) (-5.02) (0.22) (2.89) (0.97) (-1.91)     
Manufacturing -0.024*** 0.095*** -0.005 -0.635*** -0.002 0.060*** 0.041*** -0.002 -0.004** 2905 11% 




-0.009 0.090*** -0.026 -0.221 -0.015 0.057* 0.065*** -0.001 -0.010*** 2901 11% 
  (0.71) (2.98) (-0.97) (-1.45) (-1.63) (1.78) (3.55) (-0.02) (-3.79)     
Wholesale Trade 0.040 0.067** 0.018 -0.067 -0.003 -0.095 0.016 -0.001 -0.002 896 10% 
  (0.26) (2.56) (0.99) (-0.28) (-0.13) (-1.64) (0.47) (-0.16) (-0.42)     
Retail Trade -0.021 0.227*** -0.206 -0.932** -0.036 0.096* 0.077** -0.008 -0.003 638 32% 
  (-1.19) (2.74) (-1.44) (-2.03) (-1.28) (1.86) (2.50) (-1.34) (-0.54)     
Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate 
0.023** 0.003 0.127 -0.467 -0.018 0.200 0.021 -0.016 0.006* 32 63% 
  (3.41) (0.02) (1.85) (-0.85) (-0.45) (2.48) (1.75) (-8.72) (3.51)     
Services -0.036*** 0.064*** -0.01 -0.643*** -0.033*** 0.030 0.050*** -0.002 -0.004 818 12% 
 
(-3.64) (3.27) (-0.41) (-3.60) (-3.13) (1.16) (2.63) (-0.98) (-1.52) 
  
 
Notes: Coefficients estimations are made by Panel estimated GLS (FGLS). The equation is as below: 
 
where  is the average estimates from the implied cost of equity capital models using equations (3) and (4),  is natural logarithm of total assetsof the firm, return variability measured as the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over the last 12 month,  is a control variable for forecast bias and measured as using the one-year-ahead forecast error (forecasts minus actual values), scaled by total assets,  inflation rate for the 
year, is financial leverage of the firm and measured as total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the year,  is dummy variable denoting Global Financial Crisis 2008,  is a variable taking values from 1 to 11 
assigned for each year to capture the trend in time,  is dummy variable equal to 1 if an observation is SC adopted, and 0 non-adopted. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively and t 






Nevertheless, for most of the sectors, becoming Islamic compliant, 
first, tends to increase cost of equity capital, probably as a consequence of 
firms’ distress due to possible financial constraints and other burdens to 
meet Shari’ah requirements. However, taking into account the time trend 
and therefore, information adjustment, the cost eventually starts to fall.  
Our results also show that long-run Shari’ah adoption effects are stronger 
in relatively tangible sectors, namely, Manufacturing, Construction, 
Transportation/Communication/Utility Services and Retail Trade, where 
investors are likely to invest more after the compliance. In particular, our 
claim is that international investors (Shari’ah compliant funds) are mostly 
interested in investing in Manufacturing and construction utility sectors, 
since by Islamic scholars these sectors are more appealed as Islamic 
scholars believe that these sectors contribute more to social welfare.  
On the contrary, non-tangible sectors that do not produce output 
(like finance or service sectors) are not so attractive within Islamic societies 
and accordingly, the investment on these sectors by Islamic funds can be 
less restricted and liquidity is limited.  Hence, non-tangible industries such 
as Services and Finance, experience no long-term Shari’ah effects in their 
cost of equity. However notably, Shari’ah compliance raises the cost of 
equity in the Services sector around the time of its adoption. 
Analysis of other control variables reveals, SIZE and inflation 
reduce cost of equity, with significant coefficients in Manufacturing, 
Construction and Services industries. Surprisingly, the leverage variable 
appears to have significant effect only in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, 
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Manufacturing, Transportation, Communication, Utility Services, and 
Retail Trade sectors as expected, shows positive coefficient, leading to 
higher cost of equity capital. On a sectoral basis, the insignificance of 
leverage can be well justified by neutralizing major leverage-risk-based 
effects on the decisions of investors as when a firm becomes Shari’ah 
compliant, it automatically signals that the leverage level is lower than 33% 
and therefore the risks are well controlled. Overall, the sectoral estimates 
exhibit similar patterns as the total sample estimates, and we could get 
relatively significant coefficients in the industries, which contained greater 
number of firms. The sectoral estimates also provide additional evidence to 
our initial insight that shocks from becoming Shari’ah compliant may 
validate higher cost of capital for firms, but these effects mitigate over time 
leading to gradual fall in the cost of equity in the long run. 
 
2.4.2 Cost of Equity and Liquidity relationship 
 
We further analyze the results by looking at the trends in stock 
market liquidity measured as share turnover ratio. We employ this figure to 
verify the robustness of the relation between adoption of SCR and cost of 
equity, which we believe is caused by liquidity of the shares. This gives us 
the opportunity to investigate the feedback effect of adopting SCR on stock 
market liquidity, which is consistent with the literature that documents a 
negative relationship between liquidity shocks and cost of equity (Diamond 
& Verrecchia, 1991; Becker-Blease & Paul, 2006). The share turnover ratio 
of the firms is calculated by dividing the total number of shares traded over 
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a period by the average number of S&P 500 index shares traded. Figures 1 
and 2 shows notable upward trend in total turnover ratio for all firms under 
all sectors over the period. The liquidity shock effect of adopting SCR in 
year 2011 is evidently present, and we can see gradual rise in the share 
turnover ratio after this point. We found similar patterns when analyzing 
share turnover ratios by individual sectors, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. 
The trends exhibit similar properties, with continuous increase in Mining 
and Manufacturing after 2011, while Transport/Communication/Utility 
Services experience long-term rise after Shari’ah compliance until around 
2014. The robustness checks for the analysis of liquidity, discussed above, 
do not alter the conclusion reached in the main findings, and indeed 
support it.  
Figure 1. Total Share Turnover by S&P 500 Index 




Note: Monthly share turnover ratio is calculated by dividing total monthly volume of traded shares of sample firms 
by monthly volume traded shares of S&P 500 index. Shari’ah adoption date corresponds to 01.01.2011. Data 









Figure 2. Sectoral Share Turnover by S&P 500 Index 
                   
 
 
Note: Monthly share turnover ratio is calculated by dividing monthly volume of traded shares of each firm by monthly 
volume traded shares of S&P 500 index and averaged 5 months. Divisions are Mining (B), Manufacturing (D), and 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary (E) service respectively. Shari’ah adoption date 




2.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Our study was motivated by the proposition that adoption of 
Shari’ah compliance points to general advantages. Higher transparency and 
information disclosure, attraction of a large number of potential investors 
from oil-rich countries and a lower-risk environment with lower leverage 
and other screening measures are some advantages of being Shari’ah 
compliant. We analyze the effects of becoming Shari’ah compliant on the 
cost of equity capital while controlling the impact of other determinants 
such as leverage, firm size and return volatility. Our estimations also 
include business sector-specific effects to account for the industrial patterns 
reflecting in the cost of equity after SCR adoption. Since optimal capital 
structure is one of the ultimate goals of financial managers, this study 
provides useful insights and some empirical evidence on the management 
of equity capital in the light of Shari’ah equity developments. 
Our results show that transitional implications of Shari’ah 
compliance can diverge depending on a time trend and information spread. 
The findings reveal that becoming Shari’ah compliant initially increases the 
cost of equity, potentially due to higher financial constraints and other 
burdens associated with Shari’ah requirements. However, when the model 
is checked to account for a time trend, we find that Shari’ah compliance 
will eventually lead to a fall in the cost of equity capital over time. This 
implies that it may take some time for the firms and markets to incorporate 
the relevant considerations associated with the adoption of SCR news and 
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shift their expectations according to new conditions. Specifically, we find 
the magnitude of the Shari’ah effects to be trivial, despite its significant 
coefficients across most of the industries. In addition, inflation and return 
volatility appear to be important factors to change cost of capital, 
documenting strong positive impact. Consistent with the theory and recent 
findings, firm size contributes to a fall in equity cost, which is valid for 
almost all sectors. We observe that significance of the estimated 
coefficients largely depended on greater availability of firms in the sector-
samples, while both industry-based and total sample estimations validated 
identical patterns. Our further robustness analyses confirm that adoption of 
SCR increases the stock liquidity of SCR adopted firms, which co-varies 
negatively with the cost of equity. 
Our findings imply that firms can expect long-run benefits from 
becoming Shari’ah compliant in terms of reducing their equity costs 
through increasing investor base and liquidity. This finding is important 
from the perspectives of financial and capital structure management. 
Together with providing a novel approach to shed light on recent Islamic 
equity developments, our study also opens up a number of avenues for 
future research. For example, the study could be extended to investigation 
of SCR effects across global markets and international country-levels. It 
would be interesting to compare and contrast global trends in the corporate 
response to Shari’ah equity market developments in different regions, with 









As it discussed in the previous chapter adoption of SCR can 
potentially lead to a number of significant capital market benefits. First, it 
can facilitate a firm’s access to the savings of religious sensitive investors, 
who constitute a large number, considering the population of the Muslim 
world.16 Channelling these funds and investments into the corporate sector 
could improve the liquidity of the capital markets and boost the firm 
investor ground, which results in the enhancement of risk sharing and 
decreasing the cost of equity (Merton 1987).  Second, Islamic finance makes 
a firm inherently less prone to financial distress, since its risk-sharing feature 
reduces firm leverage17, encourages better risk management and is founded 
on strong ethical precepts (Kammer, Norat, Pinon, Prasad, Towe & Zeidane, 
2015).  
Together with offering a number of advantages, such as mean–
variance efficiency (Akhtar, Jahromi, & Smith, 2017) and better firm 
performance (Walkshäusl & Lobe, 2012; Reddy & Fu, 2014), Shari’ah 
compliance rules also impose certain requirements as explained in previous 
chapters. These conditions naturally lead to an alteration in the capital 
structure of a Shari’ah compliant firm-at least aim to be-and therefore, have 
                                                                                 
161.75 billion Muslims around the world, which is about 24% of the world's population (Global Religious 
Landscape Report, April 2017). 
17One of the requirements of being Shari’ah compliant is keeping a debt level within certain limits. 
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direct effects on many aspects of this firm’s policies, including corporate 
payout policy, that captures both investment and debt decisions. 
While earlier research in the literature  states that the dividend policy 
is independent from the debt and investment policies (Modigliani & Miller, 
1961), growing finance literature  (Dhrymes & Kurz, 1967; Fama,1974; 
Myers, 1974; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Brav, Graham, Harvey, & Michaely, 
2005) acknowledge that all of the three elements of firm financing are inter-
related. This is especially true for firms, which smooth their payouts to keep 
them less fluctuating and minimize the effects of income volatility through 
the adjustment of debt and investment. Most firms undertake borrowings 
and investment policies to absorb shocks to net earnings and keep corporate 
payouts stable (Lintner,1956; Bhattacharya, 1979; Brav et al., 2005; 
Anderson & Carverhill, 2012; Lambrecht & Myers, 2012; Chen, 2016; and 
Hoang & Hoxha, 2016). Under these conditions, the obvious question would 
be how and to what extend Shari’ah compliant firms maintain their policies 
of payout smoothing (if they want to carry on being a Shari’ah compliant 
firm) by changing debt and investment strategies. Firms that want to 
continue to be Shari’ah compliant, need to meet the requirements cited 
above and this might impact on their payout policies. Thus, it is fundamental 
to ascertain the implications of SCR on firms’ payout behaviour, which 
needs special empirical analysis and approach. Becoming Shari’ah 
compliant would considerably affect not only the capital structure of a firm 
(Girard & Hassan, 2008; Narayan, Phan, Sharma & Westerlund, 2016) but 
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also the dynamics of its smoothing behavior in reaction to fluctuations of net 
earnings.  
According to the literature, firms typically smooth shocks in earnings 
through dividend smoothing. Firstly, Lambrecht & Myers (2012) and Hoang 
& Hoxha (2016) document that most firms prefer to smooth payouts to keep 
them stable, typically through changes in debt and investment to neutralise 
the effects of the fluctuations in net income. More specifically, Lambrecht & 
Myers (2012) show that undesired income shocks are primarily absorbed by 
debt financing, while Hoang & Hoxha (2016) indicates that positive shocks 
in times of favorable conditions lead to the decision of an increase in 
corporate investment. Consistent with these premises, we are particularly 
interested in whether the adoption of SCR triggers significant changes in 
firms’ intertemporal budget constraint and if these changes cause an 
interaction of the three corporate financing decisions, namely investment, 
debt and dividend policies. This is because under the SCR conditions, a firm 
may face additional constraint – certain limits imposed to the debt ratio (up 
to 33%), which would limit its capability of debt financing in the case of 
severe negative income shocks. On the other hand, SCR do not apply any 
restrictions on the changes in investment, which means that in the case of 
positive shocks to net income, firms might be able to smooth them through 
investment expansion without major disturbances. In the context of these 
important managerial and policy questions, our research is the first paper 
that empirically analyses the impact of adopting SCR on firms’ payout 
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smoothing policies through adjustments in debt and investment to smooth 
the net income fluctuations. 
The present study complements the literature in several ways. The 
ultimate aim of this study is to model and analyse the changes in payout 
smoothing policy of a firm after becoming Shari’ah compliant. We employ a 
variance decomposition strategy that enables us to empirically analyse the 
adjustments of borrowing and investment policies to comply with smoothed 
payout in order to neutralise net income fluctuations in the environment of 
Shari’ah compliance. Furthermore, the paper aims to identify and assess a 
possible mechanism behind such linkage and augment the amount of 
fluctuations in net earnings absorbed by investment, borrowing and payout 
policies. This method explicitly accounts for the alterations in the market’s 
growth expectations around adoption of SCR. It also enables us to evaluate 
the magnitude of both absorbed and unobserved shocks to net income and 
how the smoothing policies are quantitatively affected after becoming SCR, 
which imposes additional constraint in the debt financing policy.  
We are particularly interested whether and to what extent the amount 
of fluctuations to net earnings absorbed by investment and borrowing policy 
are altered after SCR adoption, and what implications it may have for payout 
smoothing policies of the firms. In particular, we conduct our empirical 
estimations by dividing our data into different time periods for firms: before 
and after becoming Shari’ah compliant and check the magnitudes of the 
changes in payout smoothing behaviour by revising debt, investment 
strategies. The study also aims to identify and assess a possible mechanism 
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behind such linkage, more specifically smoothing behaviour by altering debt 
and SCR of restricting debt financing, and to distinguish the impacts of 
temporary vs. permanent net income shocks on the dividend policy of the 
firms. 
More importantly and very novel to the literature, we also 
decompose the payout smoothing into permanent and temporary income 
shocks to check if the firms behave in accordance with the permanent 
income hypothesis (Friedman 1957). Our findings show that payout growth 
has a significant correlation with the average income growth with 22.22% 
indicating that average net income growth significantly explains the payout 
changes of firms. 
Due to the variations in the capital structure and payout policies of 
the firms in different industries, results might vary across different 
industries. Thus, we also differentiate our firms into industries to detect 
sector- specific effects and account for the industry patterns reflected in the 
payout smoothing policy after SCR adoption. Our study is based on a 
comprehensive panel sample of 34055 firm-year observations classified into 
nine industries over the period of 1982-2016.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents 
a brief literature review; section 3.3 discusses the methodology and outlines 
the estimation model. The empirical estimation with findings and insights 
are presented in section 3.4. Lastly, section 3.5 makes some concluding 






3.2 Prior Research and Theoretical Background 
 
Payout policy has been analysed both theoretically and empirically 
since Lintner (1956), who laid the base for the modern theory of the payout 
policy. In his pioneering study, Lintner (1956) explored the impact of payout 
policy on the capital structure decisions, and managers usually adjust the 
target payout ratio based upon the value of available investments as well as 
changes in net income. Using cash dividends as a measure of payout in the 
example of 28 mature firms, Lintner (1956) found that net income was the 
most important determinant of any alterations in dividend payouts, which 
were adjusted from year to year. In contrast to Lintner (1956), Miller & 
Modigliani (1961) argued that in perfect capital markets, a firm's payout 
policy is irrelevant to earnings and does not have joint dynamics with firm 
value. However, they admitted that dividend payments have signalling effect 
as they convey information about future cash flows and earnings of the firm. 
Later research on the dividend strategy have been primarily concerned if 
there is any optimum payout ratio that would maximize the current worth of 
the shares and the possible factors that should be considered in order to 
achieve that level, if it exists. The literature on payout policy can be grouped 
by asymmetric information based and agency considerations motivated. 
In the presence of information asymmetry between investors and 
managers on the financial situation of the firm in the informationally 
imperfect capital markets, trends in the dividend payouts  give a strong 
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signal about the current and future net income of a firm. Bhattacharya 
(1979), Miller & Rock  (1985) and Kose & Williams (1985) provided 
models, which document that firms adjust dividends to signal their future 
activities. An increase in payout typically signals the firm will perform 
better, and a fall suggests that it will perform worse (Allen & Michaely, 
1995). In line with this, Nissim & Ziv (2001) found that dividend payout 
changes are positively correlated with the future net income.  
Another idea is that the separation between ownership and 
management in corporations increases conflicts of interest between both 
parties, which are referred to as agency conflicts (Fama & Jensen 1983, 
Jensen & Meckling 1976), and dividend policies might address such agency 
problems. Myers (1977), Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) argue that 
unless earnings are paid out to shareholders, they may be invested to 
projects that provide private benefits for the managers. According to Rozeff 
(1982), Easterbrook (1984),  Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 
(2000) and DeAngelo & DeAngelo (2000) paying more dividends may lead 
to reduce agency costs. 
From a theoretical outlook, one can go besides signalling and agency 
theory to illustrate the determinants of a dividend policy. They have been 
extensively studied and despite differing conclusions on the magnitude and 
behaviour of payout determinants, almost all of the work document the 
presence of a firm interaction between investment, borrowing and payout 
policy. Myers & Majluf (1984) documented that firms prioritize their 
sources of financing and initial use of internal financing, then borrow and 
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finally raise equity capital. This prioritization implies a relationship between 
budget constraints and payout policy of firms. For example, Brav et al. 
(2005), documented that firms initially arrange investment and liquidity 
needs and then alter the dividend payout. In an empirical study Deangelo 
and Deangelo (1990) analysed 80 NYSE firms that made multiple losses 
during 1980-1985, and find that most of them respond with dividend 
reductions during times of financial distress, although the paper did not 
show exact motivations underlying these cuts. However, when analysing the 
relationship between the debt and payouts in usual times, Jensen (1986) 
argued that managers create debt in order to keep payouts steady and avoid 
dividend cuts that may signal stock price reductions. The work also 
mentions about the adjustments in firm investment based on cash flow 
shocks, which also have implications for debt policy. Thus, the pattern of 
dividend action of firms should be examined by jointly considering the 
dynamics of investment and external financing.  
Aivazian, Booth & Cleary (2006) summarized the joint interaction of 
investment, dividend and debt decisions as a dividend smoothing. The study 
shows that firms with public borrowing are more likely to pay a dividend 
and then follow a payout smoothing policy, than firms that rely exclusively 
on private borrowing. Smoothing also helps minimise agency and signalling 
problems within the corporations, especially when they have access to 
public market debt. Javakhadze, Ferris, & Sen (2014) examined the extent to 
which agency theories explain payout smoothing and find that managers of 
firms with less market-to-book ratios as well as the firms in highly 
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competitive industries engage in greater payout smoothing.  They also 
documented that some factors such as legal requirements, culture and tax 
regulations have additional explanatory power for payout smoothing. 
Lambrecht & Myers (2017) proposed a theoretical model of the dynamics of 
firm behavior, which shows that managers lower the volatility in the 
distribution of dividends in order to smooth their own incentives. They 
found that for a given investment policy, volatility of net income is absorbed 
by borrowing in order to keep dividends and thus, managerial incentives 
smooth. 
In light of the previously mentioned empirical evidence on the 
preferences of managers to keep smoothed payouts, it is of utmost 
importance to examine how smoothing policies will be affected by the 
adoption of SCR by firms. Despite its significance, the argument whether 
and to what extent adoption of SCR affects dividend policy of a firm, 
remains an open question. While the volume of Islamic finance is increasing 
and posing important managerial questions on the issue of the adoption of 
SCR, there is no detailed empirical research on how becoming Shari’ah 
compliance would impact the interaction among payouts, debt financing, 
investments and earning. Consistent with the requirements of the Shari’ah 
financial regulations on the restriction of debt issuance beyond 33%, firms 
will be unable to extend their debt financing to smooth the firm’s cash flow 
to maintain dividends less variable. Existing literature on Islamic finance 
and SCR significantly lacks theoretical insights and empirical evidence on 
the estimation and evaluation these changes, that will come along with the 
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adoption of SCR. There have been some empirical investigations on the 
effects of SCR from different perspectives such as behaviour of Shari’ah 
compliant stocks and their co-movement with Sukuks (Aloui, Hammoudeh 
& Hamida, 2015), risk and returns (Hanif, Shah & Iqbal, 2015; Narayan et 
al., 2016 and Akhtar et al., 2017) and firm performance (Girard & Hassan, 
2008; Walkshäusl & Lobe, 2012 and Reddy & Fu, 2014). To fill the existing 
gap in the literature, this study takes the first step to empirically examine the 
implications of SCR on payout smoothing policy of firms under conditions 
of certain debt restrictions and their further impact on investment 
adjustments, which firms undertake as a response to changes in net income. 
The issue is important not only for corporate managers and their policy-
making strategies, but also to shareholders planning portfolios and to 
economists to understand the functioning of the Shari’ah compliant capital 
markets and instruments.  
 
3.3 Methodology and Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section, we describe the empirical methodology and data used 
to analyse the dividend payout smoothing.  The foundation model for a 
firm’s smoothing behavior considers its inter-temporal budget constraint, 
first introduced by Lintner’s (1956) target adjustment model, further 
developed by Lambrecht & Myers (2012):  
 




In this model firm can adjust the variabilities in  by 
changing net  which is the repayment of debt, increase in borrowings, 
and changes in cash balances18. Lintner’s (1956) model considered that 
dividends follow long-run target based upon the value of available 
investments as well as net income, and managers are reluctant to make 
frequent changes to payouts over the periods. Lintner constructed the model 
inductively, relying on the survey of 28 big corporations, whereby payout 
consisted solely of cash dividends. Lambrecht and Myers (2012) extended 
the model (as stipulated in Equation 1) with a number of modifications that 
included clear and more detailed definitions and measures and, overall, 
better reflected combined theory of payout, debt, and investment, consistent 
with intertemporal budget constraint and the dynamics of payout 
smoothing.19 For instance, the payouts used in Lambrecht & Myers (2012) 
model comprised of both cash dividends and stock repurchases to indicate a 
total payout; accordingly, we make use of the both estimates as a measure of 
payouts in this paper.   
Overall, equation (1) shows that when there are shocks to 
 and firms want to maintain steady payouts, the intertemporal 
budget constraints might be balanced by the changes in net debt ( ), 
and/or by the adjustment of  . Hoang & Hoxha (2016) mention 
that increase in investment can be expected in times when income shocks 
present favourable growth opportunities to firms. Otherwise, they can keep 
                                                                                 
18All of which are restricted by SCR. 
19 More detailed explanations are provided in Lambrecht and Myers (2012) 
 
50 
investments fixed and undertake changes in debts as the main tool to smooth 
(negative) fluctuations in net income.  
Based on this background model and theory, we assume that firms 
are reluctant to cut their payouts as well as to increase them uncontrollably 
(Lintner, 1956; Brav et al., 2005; and Lambrecht & Myers, 2012). Under 
this payout smoothing hypothesis, we examine what happens to firms’ 
smoothing strategies after becoming Shari’ah compliant. In order to 
quantitatively estimate smoothing policies of the firms, we implement the 
variance decomposition model, developed by Asdrubali, Sørensen, & Yosha 
(1996) and Sørensen & Yosha (1998). In their paper, Asdrubali et al. (1996) 
elaborated a variance decomposition method to decompose the volatility of 
shocks to the US GDP absorbed by fiscal policy and capital markets. Since 
then, the methodology has been used to decompose the channels of income 
and consumption smoothing. For example, Balli & Balli (2011) examined 
the potential welfare gains and channels of income smoothing for Pacific 
Island countries and break down output using the same methodology to 
quantify the extent and channels of risk sharing across region; Balli, Kalemli 
& Sørensen (2012) estimated the channels of international risk sharing 
through savings, factor income flows, and capital gains between European 
Monetary Union (EMU), European Union, and other OECD countries; Balli, 
Pericoli & Pierucci (2016) apply the standard income variance 
decomposition methodology for the first time to test the role and the extent 
of smoothing channels at a micro level using a sample of UK households. 
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Following Hoang & Hoxha (2016), and adapting the strategy of 
Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Sørensen & Yosha (1998), we suggest following 
identity in order to identify the firm's intertemporal budget constraint: 
           (2) 
 
Firms may smooth volatility of earnings through borrowings, which 
is emulated by the difference between  and 
. Further smoothing can be done through 
investment, which is emulated as the difference between 
 and  (from equation 1) when fluctuations 
in earnings are not completely smoothed by borrowing. 
Consistent with Hoang & Hoxha (2016), we apply variance 
decomposition of firm earnings growth in order to get regression equations 
that will allow us to document the magnitude of fluctuations to 
 absorbed by channels of  and investment. We log 
transform and first difference the variables in Equation (2) to express them 
as growth rates. Finally, we multiply both sides by  and 






   (3) 
 
We divide both sides of Equation (3) by the variance of 
to get the slope coefficients from three different panel 
univariate regressions which totals to 1: 
 
   (4) 
 
Where   is the slope coefficient in the regression of 
 on  
and represents the debt channel;  is the slope coefficient in the regression 
of  on  
and represents the investment channel; and finally, is the slope 
coefficient, in the regression of  on 
represents the payout channel of smoothing of earnings. 
The coefficients from Equation (4) are obtained from the following 








  (5c) 
 
Where i is firm indexes; t is year indexes; for each regression above. 
We can economically interpret a hypothetical 100% increase in the growth 
rate of  as the above variables in the equations are expressed 
in growth rates. According to Equation (5a), if fluctuations are completely 
smoothed by paying back debt, the growth rate of  is 100%, which 
indicates the term  to grow at 0 rate. A regression 
of  on 
 yields the coefficient  equal to 1 if fluctuations to net 
income are perfectly absorbed by a policy of paying back borrowing. If 
 increases by 100% and there is no smoothing at all at the 
borrowing level, then  grows at the same rate as 
. Therefore, regressing 
 on 
 makes  equal to zero. If fluctuations of net income are 
not absorbed by borrowing totally, then further absorption of the remaining 
fluctuations occurs by alterations in investment with the same logic 
explained in the case of debt. So, the next level of smoothing occurs in 
Equation (5b) where the dependent variable is 
 which is representing the 
investment and the coefficient  capture the incremental magnitude of 
fluctuations of earnings that are passed through to investment. If borrowing 
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and investment policy unable to eliminate fluctuations of earnings, then 
. Therefore,  is estimated in equation (5c) and  is the 
coefficient that yields the growth of dividends or percentage of fluctuations 
of earnings remained non-absorbed.  Both cross section and time fixed 





In order to analyze the magnitude of shocks to earnings absorbed 
around the SCR adoption, we target firms that adopted SCR recently. In 
other words, the selected firms were not originally Shari’ah compliant (had 
operated with conventional equities). They were accepted as Shari’ah 
compliant at some stage of their activity and remained so over the sample 
period of time, which gives us opportunity to analyse post adoption changes 
in firms financing decisions. As of December 2016, we find a total of 973 
SCR adopted US firms, identified by Ideal Ratings. These firms are 
consistent with the Ideal Ratings business and financial screenings, based on 
the AAOIFI standards. To measure the amount of changes of earnings 
absorbed by borrowing, investment and the amount remained unabsorbed, 
we obtain yearly data on financial variables such as net income, short term 
and long-term debt, cash balances, cash dividends, stock repurchases and 
equity issuances from CompStat over the period 1982-2016.  
In Table 8, the means and standard deviations for net income, debt, 




















Notes: The sample comprises 34055 firm-year observations from 9 sectors between 1982 and 2016 for which 
sufficient Compustat financial data exist.  
 
A correlation matrix is reported in Table 9. We use logarithmic 
transformation of the variables to eliminate any possible Heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation issues. We also perform the necessary tests to diagnose 
any remaining problems of the residual tests. Any unit root issues are also 
eliminated after log differencing.   
 
 
Table 9. Correlation matrix. 
 Δlog NI Δlog ND Δlog Investment Δlog Payout 
Δlog NI 1    
Δlog DEBT 0.01 
1   
Δlog INVESTMENT 0.05 0.26 
1  
Δlog PAYOUT 0.02 -0.03 -0.10 1 
     
 
Notes: The sample comprises 34055 firm-year observations from 9 sectors between 1982 and 2016 for 
which sufficient CompStat financial data exist.  
 
We further classify these equities according to the sectoral 
characteristics of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) to analyse 
whether or not there are significant differences across the sectors. The SIC 
classifies a system of 10 industries namely - Agriculture, Forestry and 





NET INCOME 247385.3 1392152 13.20591 308.21 
DEBT 80591.64 1024875 16.58391 687.5381 
INVESTMENT 1912166 8819506 14.45011 307.586 
PAYOUT 271563.4 1313936 13.3826 265.2251 
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Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary service, Wholesale Trade, 
Retail Trade, Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, Services and Public 
Administration. Table 10 displays the number of firms for each sector. 
 
Table 10. Industrial Classification of Firms 
Industry Title SIC Division Equities 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (1) 3 
Mining (2) 79 
Construction (3) 17 
Manufacturing (4) 498 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
Gas and Sanitary service 
(5) 89 
Wholesale Trade (6) 46 
Retail Trade (7) 77 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (8) 14 
Services (9) 150 
Public Administration (10) 0 
 Total 973 
 
Notes: Firms are classified according to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). SIC (10) division is omitted from 
analysis due to absence of data.  
 
 
3.4 Estimation Results and Discussions 
 
3.4.1. Benchmark results 
 
We start our analysis by estimating the fractions of debt, investment 
and payout that smooth the volatility of Net Income, using firm level data. 
We use equations 5a, 5b and 5c to run panel regressions. In Table 11, we 
present our benchmark results. We find that 37.25% of fluctuations of 
earnings are eliminated by borrowing and 62.27% of shocks are absorbed 
through investment channels. The results also document that borrowing and 
investment are primary channels in smoothing a large fluctuation of 
earnings.   On the other hand, 1.3 % of the net income shocks are smoothed 
with dividend (payout) policy changes. These findings are consistent with 
the literature, indicating that net income shocks are not reflected in dividend 
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payouts (only 1.3%), but mostly those shocks are buffered with debt and 
investment policy changes. 
 
Table 11. Benchmark results. 

























Notes: This table displays the benchmark results from estimating the variance decomposition equations. The sample 
consists of 973 firms taken from the CompStat database and covers the period 1982–2016. The numbers displayed 
represent the percentage of fluctuation of firm earnings absorbed by borrowing ( ) and investment ( ).  Payout ( ) 
represents the amount of fluctuations unabsorbed. Also, it measures the response of payouts to fluctuations in earnings. 
The measure for payouts is the sum of cash dividends and stock repurchases net of equity issues.  is the slope 
coefficient from a regression of Δlog NI − Δlog(NI + ΔD) on Δlog NI is the slope coefficient from a regression of 
Δlog(NI + ΔD) − Δlog P on Δlog NI.  is the slope coefficient from a regression of Δlog P on Δlog NI. Coefficients are 
multiplied by 100. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively and t statistics are 
reported in parenthesis. 
 
In order to capture the effect of a dichotomous break after being 
Shari’ah compliant, we divide the sample period into three periods. Overall 
sample period is from 1982 to 2016; 1982 - 2010 captures the period before 
becoming Shari’ah compliant (SC), and the second period after the 
compliance which is between 2011 and 2016. Overall, the results reveal that 
there is almost a 4% decrease in debt smoothing indicating that after 
becoming SC, a firm smooths the net income by more payouts due to 
restriction of Shari’ah compliance in debt financing. For the 28 years period 
from 1982 to 2010, the income smoothing via debt stays stable at around 37-
38%, however, it drops to 34% in the last 5 years, which corresponds to 
being Shari’ah compliant. This sudden drop might be due to debt restriction 
of SCR and the inflexibility of the firms’ suing debt to finance payout when 
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the firms’ the net income decreases. Even for a longer period of time, for SC 
firms, we might expect this channel (debt financing) to be lower in 
smoothing the net income shocks. On the other hand, there is an increase in 
payout smoothing from 1.3% to 3% in the last 6 years, indicating that SC 
firms’ payouts would be more correlated with their net income fluctuations 
after they become SC. In other words, when these SC firms experience 
negative shocks in their net income, they would reflect the shocks in their 
payouts, instead of getting debt and paying smoothed dividends. This 
tendency gets stronger (1.3% to 3%) after the firms became SC. 
Table 12 illustrates the second specification model, which re-assures 
whether the joint effect of Shari’ah compliance and change in Net Income 
on Debt, Investment and Payout is simultaneously feasible and significant. 
The aim of the estimations in this model is to examine the behaviour of 
firms to smooth income fluctuations in the environment Shari’ah 
Compliance through debt, investment and payout channels. Results reveals 
that absorption by Debt and Payout is significant. Consistent with our 











Table 12. Shari’ah Interaction Results. 
 Δlog NI Δlog NI *Shari’ah 













Notes: This table displays the benchmark results from estimating the variance decomposition equations. The sample 
consists of 973 firms taken from the CompStat database and covers the period 1982–2016. The numbers displayed 
represent the percentage of fluctuation of firm earnings absorbed by borrowing ( ) and investment ( ).  Payout ( ) 
represents the amount of fluctuations unabsorbed. Also, it measures the response of payouts to fluctuations in earnings. 
The measure for payouts is the sum of cash dividends and stock repurchases net of equity issues.  is the slope 
coefficient from a regression of Δlog NI − Δlog(NI + ΔD) on Δlog NI is the slope coefficient from a regression of 
Δlog(NI + ΔD) − Δlog P on Δlog NI.  is the slope coefficient from a regression of Δlog P on Δlog NI. Coefficients are 
multiplied by 100. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively and t statistics are 
reported in parenthesis. 
 
 
3.4.2. Industry Based Estimations 
 
We further differentiate firms into nine separate industries to detect 
specific sector-based effects after adopting Shari’ah requirements and 
analyse the patterns in the borrowing, investment and dividend payout. In 
fact, there are ten sectors by Standard Industry Classification, however, for 
the public administration sector we could not find SCR adopted firms that 
became Shari’ah compliant at the same date as the whole sample. Therefore, 
we did not include this industry in our estimations. We also, clustered 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, Construction, Wholesale Trade and 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate sectors together, due to the few numbers 
of firms in each of these sectors. Table 6 displays industry-based estimation 
results of variance decomposition equations with some interesting points to 
mention. Sectoral analysis results are consistent with firm level analysis and 
indicate that firms become less flexible in smoothing their dividends via 
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debt due to the restrictions of SCR in some (SIC 2, 7 and 9) sectors. In fact, 
investment portion of the smoothing increased in these sectors. After being 
Shari’ah compliant, for most of the sectors, the extent of payout smoothing 
changed from negative figure to positive and increased by an average of 3% 
except for the Manufacturing sector (SIC 4). Portion of debt observing the 
shocks to Net Income declined in sectors of Mining (SIC 2) (from 48% to 
27%), Retail Trade (SIC 7) (from 48% to 38%) and Services (SIC 9) (from 
39% to 31%). Firms across clustered sectors and Manufacturing, 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary services, do not 
experience a fall in the portion of debt after becoming Shari’ah compliant. 
Investment portion of the smoothing in these sectors is decreased too. 
However, we should not ignore the fact that number of firms in each 
industry sample is considerably low, as well as the share of this industry in 
total economy, so the results may not reflect all the available information.  
Overall, the sectoral estimates exhibit similar patterns as the total 
sample estimates reported in Table 13. The sectoral estimates also provide 
additional evidence to our initial insight that be Shari’ah compliant restricts 
firms’ debt financing capability and hence, firms’ smooth volatility of Net 



































Notes: This table displays the sectoral results from estimating the variance decomposition equations. The sample consists of 973 firms taken from the CompStat database and 
covers the period 1982–2016. The numbers displayed represent the percentage of fluctuations of firm earnings absorbed by borrowing ( ) and investment ( ). Payout ( ) 
represents the amount of fluctuations unabsorbed. Also, it measures the response of payouts to fluctuations of earnings. The measure for payouts is the sum of cash dividends 
and stock repurchases net of equity issues.  is the slope coefficient from a regression of Δlog NI – Δlog (NI + ΔD) on Δlog NI. is the slope coefficient from a regression of 
Δlog (NI + ΔD) − Δlog P on Δlog NI.  is the slope coefficient from a regression of Δlog P on Δlog NI. t statistics are reported in parenthesis. Coefficients are multiplied by 
100. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively and t statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
Sectors 



































































































































3.4.3 Decomposition of Payout Smoothing 
 
One of the characteristics of income smoothing is that it has an inter-temporal 
dimension (Acharya & Lambrecht, 2015). The permanent income hypothesis states 
that it is the changes in permanent income (rather than changes in temporary 
income), that cause changes in an economic agent’s consumption. Consequently, a 
firm's spending patterns may also change not according to temporary, but 
permanent income. Firms may also alter their payout policy according to their 
expected long-term income because the relationship between a firm and its payout 
may be similar to that between consumers and consumption. Therefore, firms are 
more concerned with the expected long-term income changes than current income 
changes (Darling, 1957). Besides, from a shareholder perspective, shareholders 
would expect less fluctuations in their dividend income streams in response to the 
changes in firm income.  
One of the main drawbacks of implementing the variance decomposition 
model, developed by Astrubali et al (1996) is that it fails to reconcile temporary 
(risk-sharing) and permanent (intertemporal) payout smoothing over time. 
Therefore, a full analysis of payout smoothing requires a joint examination of risk 
sharing and intertemporal smoothing hypotheses. Using characteristics of panel data 
analysis and methodology proposed by Mundlak (1978), Asdurbali & Kim (2008) 
propose a model to easily distinguish between permanent vs. temporary shocks. 
Asdurbali & Kim (2008) distinguish neatly between smoothing of current vs. 
permanent output shocks.20 We employ the same strategy in order to explore the 
                                                                                 
20This can be done by taking advantage of the complementarity between the ‘‘within’’ estimator and the ‘‘between’’ estimator 
in a panel regression 
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intertemporal payout smoothing test stemming from the same model (eq. 5c) this 
time focusing on the time dimension. The error term can be decomposed as: 
 
 




Again, employing Mundlak’s (1978) strategy, we could model individual 
heterogeneity by taking explicitly into account the correlation between  and the 




In the meantime, the time fixed effect  corresponds the risk sharing effect. 
 





Here the coefficient , attached to the time average of Net Income 
( , can be explained as the extent of the correlation of permanent earnings 
growth with payouts, whereas the orthogonal coefficient , attached to current 
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earnings growth, measures the extent of correlation of payouts  with   temporary Net 
Income growth. In other words, we try to capture not only year by year (  but 
also permanent performance of the firm (  by using the average income growth 
through the periods. Similarly,  measures the degree of the “risk sharing” 
according to the literature. As stated in Huang-Meier, Freeman & Mazouz, (2015) 
the dividend payouts are systematically and strongly affected by external changes in 
the economic environment. Thus, this variable empirically quantifies the co-
movement of pay-out growth with overall income growth among firms. simply 
reflects the reaction of the payout ratio to overall income or overall output growth. 
In fact, this method can make sense when the firms aim to share the risk with each 
other. In other words, it shows how payout growth reacts to overall net income in 
the economy. 
Table 12 illustrates how Net Income shocks – be they current or permanent 
– are dealt with intertemporally (Eq. (6)). Table 7 contains the estimation of the 
equation (6), which indicates measures how does the payout growth co-moves with 
net income growth ( , average net income growth (   of the firm 
and the  aggregate income growth within the economythroughout the 
time. The first column (temporary income growth) indicates that net income growth 
only explains 1% of payout growth, similar to our findings in Table 11-where the 




Table 14. Decomposition of Payout Smoothing 
Periods 
 


























Notes: This table displays the benchmark results from estimating the variance decomposition equations. The sample consists of 973 
firms taken from the CompStat database and covers the period 1982–2016. The numbers displayed represent the percentage of 
fluctuation of firm earnings absorbed by borrowing ( ) and investment ( ).  Payout ( ) represents the amount of fluctuations 
unabsorbed. Also, it measures the response of payouts to fluctuations in earnings. The measure for payouts is the sum of cash 
dividends and stock repurchases net of equity issues.  is the slope coefficient from a regression of Δlog NI − Δlog(NI + ΔD) on 
Δlog NI is the slope coefficient from a regression of Δlog(NI + ΔD) − Δlog P on Δlog NI.  is the slope coefficient from a 
regression of Δlog P on Δlog NI. Coefficients are multiplied by 100. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 




Table 11 indicates that only a small portion (3%) of the current net income 
shocks are smoothed with payouts (dividends) after SC. However, we have 
observed that payout growth has a significant correlation with the average income 
growth with 22.22 % in the second column (permanent income growth) indicating 
that permanent net income growth significantly explains the payout changes. 
Empirically, even though payout smoothing is highly achieved in Table 4 and Table 
5 stating that dividend growth is barely correlated with current net income changes 
this is might be to the firm’s decision on payout has been given on long-term plans 
(Darling, 1957). Breakdown into sub periods shows an increase in overall 
smoothing from the 80s and 90s to the 2000s and 2010s and a subsequent increase 
in the last 5 years. Even though in the 1990s, the coefficient of   is 
statistically insignificant, in later periods, it becomes highly significant even after 
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2011, the coefficient is over 28% and statistically significant. Payout and permanent 
income growth correlation has become increasingly significant; even this is greater 
after the firms become Shari’ah compliant. This finding is highly intuitive. Since 
the SC firms would become less risky as they have limited ability to borrow and 
financial distress is avoidable, therefore firms would be more reluctant to smooth 
the payouts but the they would be affected more from the long-term performance of 
the firm.  
The statistically significant coefficient of  (9.11%) in the third 
column (aggregate income growth) is used to document the pro-cyclical nature of 
aggregate risk sharing in the literature-is also, indicating that payout is positively 
correlated with the aggregate net income growth of all firms, and clearly observed 
the pro-cyclicality of aggregate payout policy. Consistent with Carceles-Poveda 
(2005, 2009), Huang-Meier et al. (2015), literature states that firms are less willing 
to retain earnings in good times, thus pay dividends to shareholders, and vice versa. 
Thus, the firm most likely does not want to send negative signal to the market and 
due to market competition, it may increase (decrease) payout ratios when the 
economy is doing fine (bad). Breakdown into sub-periods, the analysis in table 7 
shows that even though the aggregate income growth is highly significant for all 
periods in the coefficient from the 2001 to 2010 and this amount decreases to 1.44% 
and becomes insignificant after firms become SC. The sharp decrease in the 
coefficient, after 2010s is consistent with our prior findings in Table 4 and first 
column of Table 7. This finding is also highly intuitive, as the restriction of debt 
financing of SC firms makes them less capable to leverage and more reluctant to 
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adjust the payouts in a reacting against other firms’ growth (aggregate income 
growth). 
These findings have some relevance on the permanent income hypothesis, 
which asserts that economic agents base their consumption decisions in response to 
net income changes in their expected long term rather than current income. We 
argue that the permanent income hypothesis may also have relevance to firm 
decision making; that is, long-term net income may provide insight into a firm's 
adjustment of dividend payments (payout) and share repurchases. This is also 
consistent with being Shari’ah compliant as those firms are not able to finance 
payout through extra debt. Restriction of debt financing may also, lead firms to save 
extra income for future use. 
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we extend the literature on corporate payout by applying a 
variance decomposition methodology to evaluate the financial adjustments of 
Shari’ah compliant firms make in response to changes in earnings. Our study was 
motivated by the proposition that adoption of Shari’ah compliance points to general 
advantages. A lower-risk environment with lower leverage and other screening 
measures are among these advantages. Based on the strategies proposed by 
literature, we decompose the variance in net income to quantify the amount of 
fluctuations to earnings absorbed by investment, debt and payout. We analyse the 
effects of becoming Shari’ah compliant on the payout policy of the firms. Our 
estimations also include business sector-specific effects to account for industry-
specific patterns being reflected in the payout policy after SCR adoption. Since 
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payout policy is one of the ultimate goals of financial managers, this study provides 
useful insights and some empirical evidence on the payout in the light of Shari’ah 
equity developments. 
Our benchmark results show that 37.25% of shocks to net income are 
absorbed via borrowing and 62.27% of shocks are absorbed through investment 
channels. The results also document that borrowing and investment are primary 
channels in smoothing a large amount of fluctuations to the net income. The amount 
of shocks (1.3%) left unsmoothed is associated with a change in payouts. Our 
results are consistent with the Lambrecht & Myers (2012) budget constraint theory 
that identifies debt and investment as the main mechanisms to smooth volatility in 
net income. When the model is checked to account for a time trend, we find that 
Shari’ah compliance will eventually lead to a fall in the portion of debt and rise in 
the portion of payout in smoothing income, potentially due to higher financial 
constraints and other burdens associated with Shari’ah requirements.  
Both industry-based and total sample estimations validated identical 
patterns. Specifically, we find the magnitude of the Shari’ah effects to be trivial, 
across most of the industries. Consistent with the theory and recent findings, our 
sectoral analysis results indicate that firms become less flexible in smoothing their 
dividends via debt due to the restrictions of SCR. After being Shari’ah compliant, 
for most of the sectors, smoothing patterns of net income by payout changed from 
negative figure to positive by an average of 3%.  
We further analysed a complete assessment of payout smoothing by a joint 
examination of risk sharing and intertemporal smoothing hypotheses. Payout and 
long-term income growth correlation has become increasingly significant even more 
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when the firms become Shari’ah compliant. This is quite intuitive since the firms 
would like to become less risky as they have limited ability to borrow loans and 
financial distress is avoidable. Secondly, they are not able to finance payout through 
extra debt after becoming Shari’ah compliant. Lastly, consonant with Darling 
(1957) and lending support to the permanent income hypothesis, payouts would not 
be decided on short-term income flows but in line with long term income growth. 
Last but not least, aggregate income growth among firms is also correlated with 
payout growth. We found that SC makes firms less capable to leverage and more 
reluctant to adjust the payouts in a reacting against other firms aggregate income 
growth. 
Together with providing a novel approach to shed light on recent Islamic 
equity developments, our study also opens up a number of avenues for future 
research. The study could be extended to investigation of SCR effects across global 
markets and international country-levels. It would be interesting to compare and 
contrast global trends in the corporate response to Shari’ah equity market 
developments in different regions, with varying economic conditions and diverse 
market structures. In the same way, Permanent Income Hypothesis can be tested 






CHAPTER FOUR: IMPACT OF FIRM-LEVEL POLITICAL RISK 
AND SHARI'AH COMPLIANCE ON COST OF EQUITY 




Decisions of politicians on regulation, taxation, expenditure and the 
enforcement of rules have a major impact on the business environment. Political 
risk is also a topic of hot debate among economists, business leaders, and 
politicians. However, much of existing researches on political risk have focused 
primarily on events such as presidential elections and political stability within a 
country. Until recently, research has used country-level indexes of political risk as 
proxy for the political risk and analysed the adverse impacts on firm performance 
due to the country political environment. This was due to availability of only 
country-level political risk measurement and a lack of quantification of firm-level 
political risk. Therefore, existing theoretical work has relied on country-level 
indices or event studies and has typically viewed political risk as a systematic but 
not idiosyncratic risk (Pastor & Veronesi, 2010, 2013; Born & Pfeifer, 2014; 
Belkhir, Boubakri & Grira, 2017). However, a pioneering study by Hassan, 
Hollander, van Lent & Tahoun (2019) documented the magnitude of firm-level 
political risk for the first time in the literature. They use textual analysis of quarterly 
earnings conference-call transcripts to construct firm-level measures of the extent 
and type of political risk faced by individual firms listed in the United States. Their 
special empirical research design made it possible to quantify the political risk faced 
by a given firm. Using this methodology, they documented that political shocks 
appear to be a significant source of idiosyncratic risk rather than systematic risk, 
 
72 
and firms may well be as concerned about their relative position in the distribution 
of firm-level political risk as they are about aggregate political risk. This newly 
developed dataset made it possible to analyze the impact of firm-level political risk 
on investment decisions and financial behavior of firms.  
Firm-level political risk may affect financial behaviour of firms through 
several channels. Firms exposed to firm-level political risk may choose more 
conservative dividend distributions and are more likely to terminate dividends to 
“save for rainy days”. Additionally, this perceived risk associated with high political 
risk can affect firms’ external financing costs.  
The gap in the literature on how firm-level political risk may affect the cost 
of equity capital and payouts policy and the availability of above-mentioned firm-
level political risk dataset, provide the impetus for our research. The purpose of this 
article is to address a gap in the literature by investigating the impact of firm-level 
political risk on cost of equity and dividend payout. Besides corroborating the key 
findings documented in previous research that perceived political risk as a 
systematic risk (Pastor & Veronesi, 2010, 2013; Born & Pfeifer, 2014; Belkhir, 
Boubakri & Grira, 2017) our analysis sheds light on idiosyncratic political risk by 
showing how firm-level political risk measures correlate closely with the implied 
cost of equity and dividend payouts.  
Our study contributes to the political risk literature in at least three specific 
ways. First, we consider how firm-level political risk may affect the cost of equity 
capital of firms. This augments the traditional political risk literature, which has 
tended to consider country-level political risk on the cost of equity capital. 
Understanding this relationship is becoming increasingly important for firm 
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decision making since the cost of equity is a crucial element in their future 
investment decisions. Second, we extend current literature by investigating the 
impact of firm-level political risk on payouts policy of firms and incentives of 
managers in response to political shocks.  
Additionally, novel to the literature, in order to propose a measurement of 
risk avoidance, we investigate firm efforts to mitigate political risk by being 
Shari’ah compliant. The past three decades has witnessed the emergence and rapid 
growth of Islamic finance. Islamic financial instruments and services are anchored 
in the tenets of Shari’ah21. Despite the growing popularity of Shari’ah compliant 
equities in financial markets, the literature has not yet addressed the impact of firm-
level political risk on this alternative asset class. Our identification strategy relies on 
the interaction between Shari’ah compliance and firm-level political risk. The SCR 
adoption process requires firms to meet certain conditions such as keeping 
particular financial ratios within specific limits22. In addition to debt restriction, thus 
less financial distress, profit and loss sharing and asset backing principles of Islamic 
finance may be an effective instrument for addressing the negative influence of 
firm-level risk. Taking into account these special conditions applied to Shari’ah 
compliant firms, the analysis of implications on firm behavior needs a special 
approach, empirical data and modelling methodology.  
The central purpose of our research is to model and investigate the changes 
in the cost of equity capital and dividend payouts behavior of firms after exposure to 
firm-level political risk and becoming Shari’ah compliant. Another argument is that 
Shari’ah compliance can make it less costly for investors to analyse and compare 
                                                                                 
21The set of sources of the sacred law of Islam, governing all aspects of Muslim life. 




firms across regions, facilitate cross-border investments and improve risk sharing - 
all of which could reduce the cost of equity capital. On the other hand, limitations in 
debt financing23 of Shari’ah compliance will also directly affect payout dynamics of 
firms who are affected by the political risk and may result in them being more likely 
to terminate their dividend payments. In particular, we are interested in whether and 
to what extent firm-level political shocks that impact on the dividend payouts are 
altered after SCR adoption, and what implications it may have for payouts 
smoothing policies of the firms.  
Consistent with these premises, we are interested in whether exposure to 
firm-level political risk triggers significant changes in external finance and liquidity 
of firms, contributing to a change in the cost of equity capital and dividend policy. 
Additionally, our study aims to identify and assess a possible mechanism behind 
such linkage and investigates the impact of other determinants in the model of cost 
of equity and payouts, such as leverage, firm size and return volatility. To our 
knowledge, our study is the first to examine this relationship of firm-level political 
risk and both cost of equity and payouts.  
We conduct our empirical estimations by dividing our data into different 
time periods for firms: before and after becoming Shari’ah compliant and check the 
magnitudes of the changes in the cost of equity and payouts smoothing behavior of 
the firms, which operate under firm-level political uncertain environment. Our 
analysis is based on a comprehensive panel sample of 54480 firm-year observations 
over the period of 2002-2016. Our estimations include business sector-specific 
                                                                                 
23Debt-to-asset, liquid assets-to-total assets and receivables-to-assets ratios are mandated to remain less or equal to 33%. 
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effects to account for the industrial patterns reflected in both cost of equity and 
payouts policy.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents literature 
review; section 3 data; section 4 discusses the methodologies and outlines the 
estimation models. The empirical estimation with findings and insights are 
presented in section 4.2 and 4.3. Lastly, section 5 concludes by summarising and 
discussing the findings and future research considerations.  
 
4.2 Literature review 
 
Political environments can have unexpected and adverse impacts on firm 
profitability, a phenomenon known as political risk (Simon, 1984; Brewer, 1985; 
Boddewyn, 2005). Firms exposed to political risk reduce their spending on hiring 
(Bernanke, 1983; Hassan et al., 2019) and investment (Pindyck, 1988; Hassan et al., 
2019) and instead they increase spending on lobbying expenditure and donate to 
politicians (Kang, 2016; Hassan et al., 2019). The magnitude of the effects of risks 
from political decisions, events, or conditions, on firm behavior are intensively 
studied and well documented in the finance literature (Pastor & Veronesi, 2013; 
Gulen & Ion, 2016; Jens, 2017). An extant set of studies documents that risk and 
uncertainty shocks originating from the political system affect the business cycle 
(Belo, Gala, & Li, 2013; Born & Pfeifer, 2014; Kelly, Pastor, & Veronesi, 2016; 
Mueller, Tahbaz-Salehi, & Vedolin, 2017). Risks arising from the political system, 
influence not only profitability but also asset prices (Pastor & Veronesi, 2010; 
Dimic, Orlov & Piljak, 2015; Lehkonen & Heimonen, 2015; Huang, Wu, Yu & 
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Zhang, 2015a), international capital flows and investment decisions of firms (Clark 
& Jokung, 1998; Maurice DL, 1977).  
Hassan, Hollander, van Lent & Tahoun (2019) documented that political 
shocks appear to be a significant source of idiosyncratic risk rather than systematic 
risk, and firms may well be as concerned about their relative position in the 
distribution of firm-level political risk as they are about aggregate political risk.  
The cost of equity is also altered congruent with: changes in firm risks; 
inclusion to the stock listings (Karolyi, 1998); greater information disclosure and 
transparency due to the compliance to particular standards (Daske, Hail, Leuz, & 
Verdi, 2008; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991); signalling to investors and rise in their 
recognition of a firm that leads to an increase in the investor base as well as 
liquidity (Merton, 1987; Hail & Leuz, 2009). Moreover, it is well documented in the 
literature that exposure to political risk may alter capital market participant risk 
perception (Pastor & Veronesi, 2013; Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, & Siegel, 2014) 
and this perceived risk associated with high political risk can affect firms external 
financing costs.  
In addition to the uncertainties associated with government policies and the 
macro environment, negative signalling of cutting dividends and increases in 
lobbying expenditure by firms may dramatically raise external investor risk 
perception (Pastor & Veronesi, 2010, 2013; Huang et al., 2015b) leading to a higher 
required rate of return, in other words the implied cost of equity capital.  
Akhtar, Jahromi& Smith (2017) document that there are substantial benefits 
of risk reduction and stability for Islamic stocks in comparison with conventional 
stocks. Furthermore, prior analytical and empirical studies suggest that becoming 
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Shari’ah compliance may serve as a liquidity-enhancing policy as found in 
Karimov, Balli, de Bruin, & Balli (2020), which provides greater float, since it can 
decrease illiquidity by improving investor diversification opportunities (Amihud& 
Mendelson, 1988). 
.  
4.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
 
In order to document the effects of firm-level risks originating from the 
political system on the cost of equity and corporate payouts policy we target firms 
that listed in the firm-level political risk index published by EPU (Economic Policy 
Uncertainty Index, 2019). Hassan et al., (2017) use textual analysis of quarterly 
earnings conference-call transcripts to construct a firm-level political risk index for 
individual firms listed in the United States. They adapt a contextual analysis to 
distinguish between language associated with political versus non-political topics. 
For each of 9,481 firms listed on a US stock market between 2001 and 2016, dataset 
gives the firm's name, its CompStat GVKey identifier, political risk measurement, 
as well as its logical components. 
We select country specific, particularly US firms, first of all due to data 
availability of the firm level political risk. According to our best knowledge firm 
level political risk data is only available for US firms. Secondly, main variable of 
our study, political risk index depends country specific political environment, as it 
is defined by the risk of government actions or imperfections of the country’s 
executive, legislative, or judicial institutions (Knudsen, 1974; Minor, 1994). Lastly, 
we wanted to have data from the same market so that we eliminate the country level 
macroeconomic and financial differentials between countries as Gurcharan (2010), 
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found that there is a signification relation between capital markets and financial 
leverage. Thus, accounting data for different countries may lead to different results. 
In order to avoid all these above-mentioned issues, we deliberately selected only US 
firms in our study. We obtain annual firm-level accounting data total assets, 
leverage, market-to-book ratio (MB), dividend payments, investment, free cash flow 
(FCF), market value (MV), return on equity (ROE), interest on Earnings Before 
Interest and Taxes (INTEB) and return on assets (ROA) from Worldscope 
(DataStream) and analyst forecasts and share price information from the I/B/E/S 
over the period 2002-2016. We have to choose this sample period due to the 
availability of our main variable, firm-level political risk data. We base firm-level 
political risk measurement, our main variable, on Hassan et al., (2017). Following 
Hail & Leuz (2009) we control for important firm characteristics such as leverage, 
firm size, a control variable for forecast bias and return variability and overall 
degree of risk or uncertainty the firm faces in our implied cost of equity estimations. 
Following the extant dividend literature (Huang et al, 2015; Fama & French, 2001), 
the firm-specific control variables used to investigate the impact of firm-level 
political risk on dividend payouts are firm size, return on asset, leverage, payments 
of firm to lobby, net funds from operations. We also use Shari’ah dummy variable 
to control whether firms are identified as Shari’ah compliant by Ideal Ratings, 
consistent with their business and financial screenings. Lastly, following Gulen & 
Ion (2016), we also employ Canadian Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (CAN)24, 
obtained from policyuncertainty.com, as instrumental variables in order to address 
endogeneity concerns (see discussion in section 3).  
                                                                                 
24Canada and the United States are linked by extensive trade relations; hence, their economic uncertainties should be highly 
correlated. We get Canadian EPU from www.policyuncertainty.com 
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It is good to note that there are no specific details about the distinguishable 
institutional structure or other specifics of the firms, except they voluntarily opt in 
to become a Shariah compliant. There was no evidence of special characteristics or 
structure of the firms that would eventually lead the firm to become Shariah 
compliant, and the decision of becoming such is a purely action of choice and a 
random corporate decision. In the same way, we found no distinguishable 
differences at the firm level structure. However, firms’ own decisions to become 
compliant make this study interesting. As discussed, one main incentive for such 
move for firms can be expanding their clientele base for their equity and earning the 
reputation in the finance markets as being “trustable” for the Islamic world and 
investors. However, in terms of structural differences, there is no difference 
between firms that are Shariah compliant and those that are not. Of course, 
excluding the conditions around adopting Shariah compliance rules but these will 
take place after firms decide to become Shariah compliant. 
To our knowledge, this will be the first work researching and comparing 
conventional and Shariah compliant equities, and our sample is based on the 
availability of the data in terms of both the financial/equity data and the firm level 
political risk index, particularly, with latter being very novel data.  
Descriptive statistical properties for the implied cost of equity estimates, 
dividend payouts, political risk and other control variables are given in Table 15. 
Descriptive statistical properties for the implied cost of equity estimates and control 
variables for both set of our samples reveal similar characteristics. Estimated cost of 
equity by implied method has 0.13 for Shariah firms and 0.15 for non-Shariah firms 
with standard deviation 0.08 and 1.00 respectively. Dividend reveal the mean of 
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10.51 for Shariah firms and 11.11 for non-Shariah firms with standard deviation 
2.02 and 2.16 respectively. We can see more considerable variability in the political 
risk, market value and interest/EBIT ratio of firms in our sample, that show 
relatively high standard deviation. These figures are almost consistent with those 
presented in the previous studies Hail & Leuz (2009) mean and standard deviation 
of equity cost of 11.67% and 4.47%, respectively; Huang et al., (2015)–political risk 
exposure mean of 4.794, standard deviation of 2.111 and market value mean of 
12.274, standard deviation 2.071. Our instrumental variables, ROE and CAN 
exhibit lower standard deviation 0.51, 59.34 respectively for Shariah firms and 0.82 




Table 15. Descriptive statistics for the implied cost of equity estimates, 
dividend payouts and control variables 
 Ob. Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for main (treatment) sample. (Shari’ah Compliant Firms) 
CAN 11224 144.8 232.73 62.55 59.34 0.49 1.76 
COE 8934 0.13 0.95 0 0.08 3.02 20.02 
DIV 5116 10.51 16.34 0.69 2.02 0.16 3.48 
FBIAS 5605 -0.02 9.33 -5.86 0.66 3.44 70.94 
FCF 8148 -.083 7.34 -6.90 1.17 -0.95 5.29 
INTEB 10084 89.04 218302 -22579.4 2594.75 68.55 5374.70 
INVESTMENT 39 11.66 17.10 1.09 4.34 -0.28 2.19 
LEV 11046 0.18 0.99 0 0.15 0.72 3.62 
MV 11186 7071.46 511886.8 0 25414.03 8.41 98.01 
MB 10441 3.28 709.55 0 12.59 36.61 1682.01 
PRISK 8990 104.53 3155.43 0 146.83 6.73 86.98 
ROA 11046 0.03 2.36 -6.53 0.22 -10.19 211.04 
ROE 10822 0.05 9.98 -9.36 0.51 -4.84 112.82 
RVAR 10979 0.12 3.22 0.01 0.11 8.25 147.55 
SIZE 11108 13.65 19.82 3.43 2.03 -0.02 3.13 
Panel B. Descriptive statistics for control sample. (Non-Shari’ah Compliant Firms) 
CAN 43256 141.02 232.74 62.55 59.40 0.15 1.76 
COE 20,261 0.15 0.98 0 0.1 2.8 15.57 
DIV 13947 11.11 17.68 0 2.16 -0.32 3.39 
FBIAS 27789 -0.01 9.67 -5.88 0.55 2.16 83.41 
FCF 18642 -0.02 12.36 -6.91 1.49 -0.15 6.1 
INTEB 31735 62.11 77475.33 -417419.4 10500 93.04 11107.85 
INVESTMENT 5935 14.23 21.87 0.69 2.95 -0.04 3.4 
LEV 32353 0.25 1 0.00 0.24 0.79 2.88 
MV 30611 7498.35 608960 0 24506.97 8.07 105.98 
MB 24773 6.63 30269.27 0 199.79 141.53 21277.44 
PRISK 21996 136.16 4653.6 0 195.6 8.3 137.07 
ROA 31735 -0.08 2.33 -9.77 0.53 -8.03 98.06 
ROE 29153 -0.06 9 -9.99 0.82 -3.71 45.20 
VAR 27823 0.15 3.8 0 0.18 7.78 103.68 
SIZE 33788 13.63 21.89 0 2.86 -0.29 3.7 
 
Notes: The sample comprises 54480 firm-year observations between 2002 and 2016 for firms which were listed in the firm-level 
political risk index published by Economic Policy Uncertainty and sufficient Worldscope financial data, I/B/E/S forecast, and 
pricing data exist. COE is the average cost of capital estimate implied by the mean analyst consensus forecasts and stock prices 
using equations (3) and (4). SIZE is natural logarithm of total assets of the firm. LEV is financial leverage of the firm and 
measured as total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the year. RVAR is the return variability computed as annual 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns. FBIAS equals the I/B/E/S analyst forecast error (mean forecast for the next fiscal year 
minus actual earnings) scaled by total assets. PRISK is overall degree of risk the firm faces. MB is the natural logarithm of market-
to-book ratio. MV is the market value of the firm. ROE is the return on equity rate. ROA is the return on asset rate and INTEB is 
the interest/EBIT ratio of the firm. DIV is natural logarithm of annual dividend payouts. FCF is natural logarithm of free cash 
flows from operations. INVESTMENT is the natural logarithm of firm spending on investment.CAN is Canadian uncertainty 







Table 16 displays the correlation matrix of the variables. Correlation of the 
variables of Implied Cost of Equity estimations exhibit minimum value of -0.31 
between RVAR and SIZE, and maximum value of 0.42 between SIZE and MV. 
Correlation of the variables of Dividend Payouts estimations exhibits minimum 
value of -0.30 between ROA and SIZE. We also checked for the stationarity of the 
variables using Fisher type Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) (Dickey & Fuller, 
1979) unit root tests. All variables came out to be stationary, implying there is no 
problem of unit root in the series.25 
 
                                                                                 




Table 16. Correlation of the variables. 
Correlation of the variables of Implied Cost of Equity estimations 
 
COE SIZE LEV RVAR FBIAS PRISK MV ROE INTEB 
COE 1.000         
SIZE -0.016 1.000        
LEVERAGE 0.039 0.219 1.000       
RVAR 0.180 -0.314 -0.036 1.000      
FBIAS 0.008 -0.005 -0.011 0.013 1.000     
PRISK 0.013 0.021 -0.024 0.047 0.011 1.000    
MV -0.003 0.419 -0.001 -0.113 -0.010 -0.002 1.000   
ROE -0.089 0.206 -0.018 -0.214 -0.011 -0.032 0.082 1.000  
INTEB -0.014 -0.019 -0.016 -0.008 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 0.013 1.000 
 
Correlation of the variables of Dividend Payouts estimations 
Correlation DIVIDEND SIZE LEV INVEDT. MB PRISK ROA FCF CAN 
DIVIDEND  1.000         
SIZE  0.820 1.000        
LEVERAGE 0.166 0.040 1.000       
INVESTMENT  0.727 0.923 0.034 1.000      
MB  0.032 -0.153 0.108 -0.204 1.000     
PRISK  0.198 0.210 0.080 0.232 -0.013 1.000    
ROA  -0.010 -0.303 0.042 -0.326 0.264 -0.041 1.000   
FCF  0.231 0.409 -0.164 0.438 -0.032 0.124 -0.097 1.000  
CAN  -0.012 -0.018 -0.022 -0.032 -0.065 0.077 -0.062 -0.077 1.000 
 
Notes: The sample comprises 54480 firm-year observations between 2002 and 2016 for firms which were listed in the firm-level 
political risk index published by Economic Policy Uncertainty and sufficient Worldscope financial data, I/B/E/S forecast, and 
pricing data exist. COE is the average cost of capital estimate implied by the mean analyst consensus forecasts and stock prices 
using equations (3) and (4). SIZE is natural logarithm of total assets of the firm. LEV is financial leverage of the firm and 
measured as total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the year. RVAR is the return variability computed as annual 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns. FBIAS equals the I/B/E/S analyst forecast error (mean forecast for the next fiscal year 
minus actual earnings) scaled by total assets. PRISK is overall degree of risk the firm faces. MB is the natural logarithm of market-
to-book ratio. MV is the market value of the firm. ROE is the return on equity rate. ROA is the return on asset rate and INTEB is 
the interest/EBIT ratio of the firm. DIV is natural logarithm of annual dividend payouts. FCF is natural logarithm of free cash 
flows from operations. INVESTMENT is the natural logarithm of firm spending on investment. CAN is Canadian uncertainty 
index published by Economic Policy Uncertainty.  
 
4.4 Methodology and Estimations 
 
This section sheds light on the estimation methods and techniques. We use 
ordinary least squares (OLS) in multivariate panel regressions to identify the effects 
of various firm-level and dummy variable on the cost of equity and dividend 
payouts for our sample of firms. To analyse impact of firm-level political risk on 
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cost of equity and dividend payouts, following the relevant literature, we include the 
cost of equity and dividend payouts as the dependent variable and perform 
regression analyses. Prior literature reinforces the need to control for the effects of 
endogeneity, which is due to mainly the reverse causality of dependent variables 
(cost of equity and dividend payout) with political risk (Clinch & Verrecchia, 2015; 
Kim & Park, 2009). Thus, in order to address possible endogeneity problem 
associated with reverse causality, omitted variable bias and measurement error we 
execute Two Stage Least Square Regressions (2SLS). In the 2SLS estimation we 
instrument firm-level political risk by various variables (IVs) as appropriate to both 
cost of equity and dividend payout estimations. We will discuss and examine these 
instrumental variables in detail in the relevant sections.  
 
4.3.1 Cost of Equity Analysis 
 
We begin our analysis with ex ante estimates of firm cost of equity capital, 
which was explained in detail in chapter 2, implied by market prices and analyst 
forecasts. This approach explicitly accounts for changes in the market’s growth 
expectations around firms’ exposure to firm level political risk. It also allows us to 
evaluate the magnitude of both growth and cost of equity effects on firm valuations. 
Next, we run firm-level panel regressions. In order to construct the model of the 
cost of equity and firm-level political risk nexus, we start our analyses by estimating 
the cost of equity. This implied cost of equity measure is more suitable in this 
research setting compared to the alternatives as it estimates expected returns directly 
from stock prices and cash flow forecasts without relying on biased realised returns 






4.3.1.1 Implied Cost of Equity Capital Estimation 
 
The implied cost of equity is the discount rate that sets the current stock 
price equal to the present value of expected future dividends per share. The relation 
between the current stock price , the cost of equity (r), and future expected 
dividends per share ( ) is represented by the dividend discount model 
(DDM):  
 
  (1) 
 
4.3.1.1.1. Gordon Dividend Growth Model 
 
The Gordon Dividend Growth Model, the simplest form of the DDM, 
assumes a constant perpetual rate of growth (g) in expected dividends per share, and 
the cost of equity can be written as follows: 
   (2) 
 
 
4.3.1.1.2. Abnormal Earnings Growth Models 
 
Abnormal Earnings Growth Models assume that the change in abnormal 
earnings from year to year grows at a constant rate into perpetuity. Gode & 
Mohanram (2003) implement the theoretical model of Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005) by assuming that the short-term growth rate ( ) is equal to the average of 
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the forecasted growth rate between year one and year two and the average five-year 
growth rate provided by analysts. Furthermore, they assume that the long-term 
growth rate ( ) is equal to expected inflation for all firms. The cost of equity can be 
obtained from the following relation between price, and the next year’s earnings per 
share estimate ( ) and expected dividends per share ( : 
  (3) 
 
Another Abnormal Earnings Growth model is Easton’s (2004) Modified-
PEG ratio model. It is also a modified version of the Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005) model, where the growth rate in the change in dividends is set equal to zero 
(  = 0) so that dividends grow by the same amount every year into perpetuity. The 
current stock price is related to the cost of equity, the next two year forecasted 
earnings, as well as the next year’s dividend. 
 
   (4) 
 
Our analysis focuses on these two Abnormal Earnings Growth Models. 
Following Hail & Leuz (2006), we average over the two proxies, cost of equity 
(COE) obtained from equations 3 and 4 and use the resulting mean estimate as our 
primary dependent variable COE.  
 




We start our analysis by estimating the implied cost of equity for each 
individual firm over each year of our sample (2002-2016), using firm-level data. We 
use multivariate panel regression analysis to identify the effects of various firm-
level and dummy variable on the cost of equity for our sample of firms. To examine 
the main determinants for the change of the cost of equity and to analyse impact of 
firm-level political risk on cost of equity, we include the cost of equity as the 
dependent variable and perform regression analyses.  
Following the Hail & Leuz (2006) strategy and extending it further by 
including some control and dummy variable, we estimate the coefficients of the 
following model: 
 
26    (5a) 
 
Where  is the average estimates from the implied cost of equity capital 
models, proposed by Gode & Mohanram (2003) and Easton (2004),  is 
natural logarithm of total assetsof the firm,  is a control variable for forecast 
bias and measured using the one-year-ahead forecast error (forecasts minus actual 
values) scaled by total assets, is financial leverage of the firm and measured 
as total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the year, return 
variability measured as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the last 
12 months,  is dummy variable equal to 1 if an observation is SCR 
                                                                                 
26 We also did not include a variable to control the religion and the level of religiosity within the U.S. in the model for two 
reasons. First, Shari’ah compliant equities can be bought from any part of the world despite they are traded in the US 




adopted, and 0 non-adopted,  is overall degree of risk or uncertainty the firm 
faces, and  is the error term.  
In order to augment the effect of being SC to mitigate the firm level political 
risk, we interact  with  dummy: 
 
27   (5b)   
 
Hence our main variable Political Risk is derived by transcripts of 
conference calls held in conjunction with an earnings release, these transcripts may 
be regarded as voluntary disclosure.  Prior literature on voluntary disclosure (Clinch 
& Verrecchia, 2015) reinforces the need to control for the effects of endogeneity in 
empirical disclosure research. Kim & Park (2009) also documents that, stock 
returns, which are directly related to implied cost of equity, around the disclosure 
can affect the firm’s disclosure decisions on internal control weaknesses, and 
thereby leading to a decrease or an increase in market uncertainty. Thus, in order to 
address possible simultaneity problem between firm-level political risk and cost of 
equity and the reverse causality and obtain robust results we execute 2SLS 
regression in following two steps. 
 
In the first stage of 2SLS analysis without interaction term, political risk 
variable (i.e., the endogenous variable) is regressed on IVs, which we will clarify 
later, and exogenous determinants of cost of equity as following (for Eq. 5a): 
                                                                                 
27 We also did not include a variable to control the religion and the level of religiosity within the U.S. in the model for two 
reasons. First, Shari’ah compliant equities can be bought from any part of the world despite they are traded in the US 





  (6a) 
 
In the first-stage of 2SLS analysis with interaction term, both  and 
 are regressed on IVs and exogenous determinants of cost of 
equity as following (for Eq. 5b): 
 
  (6b) 
 
To estimate the 2nd stage equations, without interaction terms (Eq. 5a) fitted 
values of the is used (Eq. 7a). To estimate the 2nd stage equations, with 
interaction terms (Eq. 5b) fitted values of the  and  
variables are employed (Eq. 7b): 
 
   (7a) 
 
    (7b)                            
 
There is a need for a thorough search and validation process in finding the 
perfect candidate for IV when applying 2SLS techniques. We need at least one IV 
satisfying the necessary conditions to be a perfect candidate as an instrument for 
. We apply similar two conditions stated in Allen, Balli and Thompson 
need (2019) to find the perfect IV. These conditions are that the chosen instrument 
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must be an exogenous variable (corr(IV, ε) = 0) and it must be strongly correlated 
with the endogenous variable (corr(IV, PRISK) ≠ 0). We use the first stage 
regressions above to validate whether the chosen IV has a strong correlation with 
the endogenous variable - - or not. For the main equation (Eq. (5a)), we can 
easily test this by determining if the coefficient of IV is highly statistically 
significant when  is regressed on Eq. (6a). However, for Eq. (6b) (the main 
equation with interaction terms) to check the same issue, we need an F test of joint 
significance test of IV, IV* , on each of the reduced form equations (Eq. 
(6b)). We apply F test to see under identification (rejection implies, the excluded 
instruments jointly are identifying the model) and SARGAN STATISTIC-TEST to 
see over identification whenever we use multiple instruments (Rejection implies 
that some of the IVs are not valid). We also applied Ramsey Reset test in order to 
test linear specification.  It showed that the estimated model is correctly specified as 
to functional form given the variables included in the regression. 
 
4.3.1.3 Estimation Results and Discussion 
 
Table 17 displays the results in different model specifications estimated 
using the GLS (Generalized Least Squares) technique. The robust standard errors 
were also applied to avoid the problem of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in 





Table 17. Multivariate regressions of cost of equity capital on political risk, 
SCR adoption and other determinants (with random effects). 
 
 Panel  2SLS 

































































SHARIAH* PRISK - - 
-0.000 
(-0.10) 
 - -0.001 
(-0.8) 
Obs. 15,376 12,527 12,527  9356 9356 
R2 1.08% 2.5% 4.08%    
Kleibergen-Paap LM 3; Ho = Under identification; P-value  0.000 0.000 
Weak Instrument-Robust Inference Test; P-value  0.636 0.000 
Endogeneity Test; Ho = Endogenous regressors are 
exogeneous; P-value 
 0.000 0.653 
 
    Notes: Coefficients estimations are calculated by Panel GLS. The equation is as below: 
 
Where  is the average estimates from the implied cost of equity capital models, proposed by 
Gode & Mohanram (2003) and Easton (2004),  is natural logarithm of total assets of the firm,  is a 
control variable for forecast bias and measured using the one-year-ahead forecast error (forecasts minus actual 
values) scaled by total assets, is financial leverage of the firm and measured as total liabilities divided by 
total assets at the end of the year, return variability measured as the standard deviation of monthly 
stock returns over the last 12 months,  is dummy variable equal to 1 if an observation is SCR 
adopted, and 0 non-adopted,  is overall degree of risk or uncertainty the firm faces, is the error 





























Table 17a. Multivariate regressions of cost of equity capital on political risk, 
SCR adoption and other determinants (Pooled OLS) 
 
 Panel  2SLS 







































































 - -0.001 
(-0.79) 
Obs. 15,376 12,527 12,527  9356 9356 
R2 2% 3.5% 3%  - - 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 3; Ho = Under identification; P-
value 
 0.000 0.000 
Weak Instrument-Robust Inference Test; P-value  0.636 0.000 
Endogeneity Test; Ho = Endogenous regressors are 
exogeneous; P-value 
 0.000 0.653 
                 
Notes: Coefficients estimations are calculated by Panel Pooled OLS. The equation is as below: 
 
Where  is the average estimates from the implied cost of equity capital models, proposed by Gode & 
Mohanram (2003) and Easton (2004),  is natural logarithm of total assets of the firm,  is a 
control variable for forecast bias and measured using the one-year-ahead forecast error (forecasts minus actual 
values) scaled by total assets, is financial leverage of the firm and measured as total liabilities divided by 
total assets at the end of the year, return variability measured as the standard deviation of monthly 
stock returns over the last 12 months,  is dummy variable equal to 1 if an observation is SCR 
adopted, and 0 non-adopted,  is overall degree of risk or uncertainty the firm faces, is the error 
term. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively and t statistics are 
reported in parenthesis. 
 
The first model specification represents the baseline model, where we find 
the relationship of the stated variables excluding the political risk indicator. All the 
coefficients reveal theoretically expected signs, with mostly significant coefficients. 
The size variable exhibits negative and significant coefficient of 0.002, which 
validates its negative impact on the cost of equity as stated in Fama & French (1992 
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and 1993). If size increases by 1%, the cost of equity increases by 0.2%. In similar 
vein, the return volatility variable ( ) with the highly significant coefficient of 
0.074, is positively related to a rising cost of capital consistent with Hail & Leuz 
(2009). Lastly, the  variable captures the effect of a dichotomous break. 
It reveals negative and significant coefficient, which indicates that after becoming 
Shari’ah compliant, a firm’s cost of equity capital decreases on average by 1.3%.  
The second specification model captures the effect of firm-level overall 
degree of political risk on cost of equity. We augmented the model by including 
the . In addition to most of the coefficients and signs of variables remain 
similar, inconsistent with the literature reveal negative sign with the 
significant coefficient of 0.000. This might be due to endogeneity issues discussed 
above. We augmented the model by including interaction variable of Shari’ah 
compliance and political risk ( ) to account for the Shari’ah 
compliance pattern on political risk in the third model. The third specification 
model also reveals that after becoming SC the impact of the political risk is not 
significantly affecting the COE. The political risk and Shari’ah interaction variable 
( ) shows negative and insignificant coefficient (-0.000), 
pointing to neutral (not significant) effects of political risk on COE after the 
Shari’ah compliance announcement.  
However, before making the general conclusion on the negative relationship 
between political risk and cost of equity and in order to address endogeneity, we 
also included the instrumental variables such as MV (market value of the firm), 
ROE (return on equity ratio), ROA (return on asset ratio) and INTEB (interest to 
EBIT ratio) to enable running 2SLS regression in Model 4 and Model 5. Despite the 
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initial validation of the negative relationship between political risk and cost of 
equity both 2SLS models reveal significant similar coefficients with negative signs 
of  variable implying that actually firm level political risk positively impacts 
cost of equity. In fact, consistent with literature, investors in stock markets require a 
premium to compensate them for bearing additional political risk (Belkhir, 
Boubakri & Grira, 2017; Pastor & Veronesi, 2013). Table 17a presents pooled OLS 
results, which are similar with random effect results. 
 
4.3.2 Dividend Payouts Analysis 
 
The prominent dividend policy model of Fama & French (2001), which 
documented the characteristics of dividend payers and significant factors in 
determining dividend payments, found a relationship between firm’s life cycle with 
the policy of dividend and retained earnings, profitability, and revenue growth, 
capital structure and growth opportunity. To analyse the dividend payouts, this 
model of Fama & French (2001) is adopted and additional key explanatory variables 
were identified in light of a review of the literature. These variables are size, 
profitability, investment (Fama & French, 2001), financial leverage, free cash flows, 
market-to-book ratio, firm-level degree of risk or uncertainty the firm faces and 
Shari’ah dummy variable. We use a panel regression analysis to identify the effects 
of various firm-level and dummy variable on the dividend payouts for our sample of 
firms. Including all these variables yields the following regression equation. To 
examine the main determinants for the change of the dividend payouts and to 
analyse impact of firm-level political risk, we include the dividend payouts as the 
dependent variable and perform regression analyses. 
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   (8a)     
Where  is natural logarithm of the dividend payouts,  is natural 
logarithm of total assetsof the firm,  is a control variable for Return on Asset, 
is financial leverage of the firm and measured as total liabilities divided by 
total assets at the end of the year,  natural logarithm of 
market-to-book ratio,  is natural logarithm of free cash flows,  is firm-
level degree of risk or uncertainty the firm faces and  is the error term. We again 
interact  with  dummy, in order to augment the effect of being 
SC to mitigate the firm level political risk: 
 
   (8b) 
 
One crucial challenge in empirical research is the presence of endogeneity. 
Roberts & Whited (2013), define three types of sources of endogeneity in corporate 
finance –omitted variables, simultaneity, and measurement error. Due to the similar 
reasons explained in the implied cost of equity estimations, there might be two 
types of endogeneity that may affect our results. First, reverse causality implies that 
the direction of causality may run from dividend policy to political risk, then vice 
versa. Second, as stated in Gulen & Ion (2016) PRISK may inadvertently capture 
firm-level political risk, but that may nevertheless affect corporate dividend policy. 
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If this is the case, there might be endogeneity caused by unobservable factors that 
influence both political risk and dividend policy at the same time. 
Thus, in order to address the endogeneity concern and obtain robust results 
we execute 2SLS regression in following two steps. In the first-stage of 2SLS 
analysis without interaction term, political risk variable (i.e., the endogenous 
variable) is regressed on IV(s), which we will clarify later, and exogenous 
determinants of dividend as following (for Eq. 8a): 
 
  (9a) 
 
 
In the first-stage of 2SLS analysis with interaction term, both  
and are regressed on IV(s) and exogenous determinants of 
dividend as following (for Eq. 8b): 
 
  (9b) 
 
To estimate the 2nd stage equations, without interaction terms (Eq. 8a) fitted 
values of the is used (Eq. 10a). To estimate the 2nd stage equations, with 
interaction terms (Eq. 8b) fitted values of the and 
variables are employed (Eq. 10b): 
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  (10a) 
 
     (10b) 
. 
We applied the same methodology as in cost of equity estimations to 
identify the perfect candidate for IV when applying 2SLS techniques.  
 
4.3.2.1 Estimation Results and Discussion 
 
Tables 18 and 18a displays the results in different model specifications 
estimated using the GLS (Generalized Least Squares) technique. The robust 
standard errors were also applied to avoid the problem of heteroscedasticity and 











Table 18. Multivariate regressions of dividend payouts on political risk, SCR 




 Panel  2SLS 























































































Obs. 2652 1978 1978  1978 1978 
R2 76% 75% 76%  - - 
Kleibergen-Paap LM 3; Ho = Under identification; P-
value 
 0.000 0.000 
Weak Instrument-Robust Inference Test; P-value  0.000 0.000 
Endogeneity Test; Ho = Endogenous regressors are 
exogeneous; P-value 
 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Coefficients estimations are calculated by Panel GLS. The equation is as below: 
 
Where  is natural logarithm of the dividend payouts,  is natural logarithm of total assets of the firm,  is a 
control variable for Return on Asset, is financial leverage of the firm and measured as total liabilities divided by total 
assets at the end of the year, is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio, is natural logarithm of free cash 
flows from operations,  is the natural logarithm of firm spending on investment,  is firm-level degree 
of risk or uncertainty the firm faces,   is dummy variable equal to 1 if an observation is SCR adopted, and 0 non-
adopted,  and  is the error term. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively and t 


















Table 18a. Multivariate regressions of dividend payouts on political risk, SCR 




 Panel  2SLS 






























































































Obs. 2652 1978 1978  1978 1978 
R2 78% 77% 77%  - - 
Kleibergen-Paap LM 3; Ho = Under identification; P-value  0.000 0.000 
Weak Instrument-Robust Inference Test; P-value  0.000 0.000 
Endogeneity Test; Ho = Endogenous regressors are 
exogeneous; P-value 
 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: Coefficients estimations are calculated by Panel GLS. The equation is as below: 
 
Where  is natural logarithm of the dividend payouts,  is natural logarithm of total assets of the firm,  is a 
control variable for Return on Asset, is financial leverage of the firm and measured as total liabilities divided by total 
assets at the end of the year, is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio,  is natural logarithm of free cash 
flows from operations,  is the natural logarithm of firm spending on investment,  is firm-level degree 
of risk or uncertainty the firm faces,   is dummy variable equal to 1 if an observation is SCR adopted, and 0 non-
adopted,  and  is the error term. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively and t 
statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
 
The first model specification represents the baseline model, where we find 
the relationship of the stated variables excluding the . The variable 
exhibits positive and significant coefficient of 0.95, which validates its positive 
impact on the dividend payouts consistent with Fama & French (2001). If the size 
increases by 1 unit the dividend payouts increase by 0.96 points. In the same vein, 
the return on asset ( ) with the significant coefficient of 4.90, is positively 
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related to rising dividend payouts, which is similar to the results of Huang et al. 
(2015).  
The second specific model includes  variable, in order to see the 
impact of firm level political risk on dividend payments. In addition to most of the 
coefficients and signs of variables remain similar, as expected  reveal 0.00 
coefficient.  
The third specification model captures the effect of being Shari’ah 
compliant on firms facing firm-level political risk or uncertainty. We augmented the 
model by including interaction variable of the Shari’ah compliance and political risk 
( ). Interaction variable also reveals similar coefficient of 
0.00. Consistent with literature  dummy variable alone reveals positive 
significant coefficient. This finding is similar with Farooq & Tbeur (2013) which 
documents that SC firms pay higher dividends than non-SC firms.  
However, this relation between PRISK and dividend payouts could suffer 
from endogeneity. Thus, before making the general conclusion on the negative 
relationship between political risk and dividend payouts, we augmented the model 
with two-stage regression by including some instrumental variables in order to 
remedy a simultaneity bias in the third model. A valid instrument should not be 
related to dividend payouts through channels other than political risk, which implies 
that most company-specific characteristics do not qualify. The fourth specification 
model with fitted firm-level political risk, reveals result similar to the initial 
validation of the neutral relationship between political risk and dividend payouts. 
However, in our fifth model interaction of variable with  
( ) has highly significant negative coefficient of 0.01, which 
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reveals has negative effect on dividend payouts after being Shari’ah 
compliant. It also provides further empirical support to the results of prior studies 
that conservative payout policies to be associated with higher exposure of firms to 
political risk. This is different from what we obtained in above case: when firms are 
not Shari’ah compliant, political risk has no impact on dividend policy of firms. 
However, when we have Shari’ah compliant firms in our sample, dividend payouts 
fall as political risk increases. When firms are Shari’ah compliant, their capabilities 
to smooth/increase payouts and therefore, retain positive attitude of investors, are 
limited (Balli, de Bruin, Ozer Balli & Karimov, 2020). This might be due to 
financial characteristics that Shari’ah requirements dictate – low leverage, low 
accounts receivable, as well as low cash and interest-bearing securities. On the other 
hand, debt financing restrictions of SC may make firms have greater financial slack, 
and more able to pay and maintain dividends as stated in Aivazian, et al. (2003). 
This finding is also supported by the Agency theory of dividend policy. Highly 
levered firms have more debt and interest obligations to meet thus have high 
probability of paying low dividends according to Jensen (1986). We also provide 
results in Table 18a when we do not control for the fixed/random effects. The 
results are quite similar with our estimations in Table 18.  
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we extend the literature on political risk by using a novel 
dataset to evaluate the impact of firm level political risk on implied cost of equity 
and dividend payout policy of firms. Our estimations also include Shari’ah dummy 
variable to account for Shari’ah compliance-specific patterns being reflected in the 
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mitigating the frim level political risk. Our study was motivated by the proposition 
that adoption of Shari’ah compliance points to general advantages. A lower-risk 
environment with lower leverage and other screening measures are among these 
advantages. Since firm-level political risk is an avoidable risk, this study provides 
useful insights and some empirical evidence on the political risk in the light of 
Shari’ah equity developments. 
Our benchmark results show that 1% increase in the exposure of political 
risk contributes to a rise in its cost of equity capital by 0.2% and in dividend payout 
by 13%. Consistent with the literature, this is due to investors in stock markets 
requiring a premium to compensate them for bearing additional political risk 
(Belkhir, Boubakri & Grira, 2017; Pastor & Veronesi, 2013) and firms facing firm-
level uncertainty try to send positive signal to the markets Huang et al. (2015). 
When the both models are checked to account for Shari’ah compliance, we find that 
Shari’ah compliance will eventually lead to a fall in cost of equity and rise in 
dividend payouts despite exposure of the firm to political risk.  
We further augmented our models with two-stage regression by including 
some instrumental variables in order to remedy endogeneity. Implied cost of equity 
2SLS models reveal similar coefficients and signs of all variables. The political risk 
and Shari’ah interaction variable ( ) reveals negative 
coefficients on both COE and dividend payouts, which reveals that political risk has 
negative effect on both cost of equity and dividend payouts after the Shari’ah 
compliance announcement.  
Together with providing a novel approach to shed light on recent Islamic 
equity developments and political risk, our study also opens up a number of avenues 
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for future research. The study could be extended to investigation of SCR effects 
across global markets and international country-levels. It would be interesting to 
compare and contrast global trends in the corporate response to Shari’ah equity 
market developments in different regions, with varying economic conditions and 





CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter concludes the thesis by providing a summary of the key findings 
and implications for each of the three essays. Essay one analysis the impact of being 
Shari’ah Compliant on cost of equity capital of the firms. Our results show that 
impact of Shari’ah compliance depends on a time trend and information spread. The 
findings reveal that becoming Shari’ah compliant initially increases the cost of 
equity, potentially due to higher financial constraints and other burdens associated 
with Shari’ah requirements. However, when the model is checked to account for a 
time trend, we find that Shari’ah compliance will eventually lead to a fall in the cost 
of equity capital over time. This implies that it may take some time for the firms and 
markets to incorporate the relevant considerations associated with the adoption of 
SCR news and shift their expectations according to new conditions. Specifically, we 
find the magnitude of the Shari’ah effects to be trivial, despite its significant 
coefficients across most of the industries. In addition, inflation and return volatility 
appear to be important factors to change cost of capital, documenting strong 
positive impact. Our findings imply that firms can expect long-run benefits from 
becoming Shari’ah compliant in terms of reducing their equity costs through 
increasing investor base and liquidity. This finding is important from the 
perspectives of financial and capital structure management. 
In essay two, we extend the literature on corporate payout by applying a 
variance decomposition methodology to evaluate the financial adjustments of 
Shari’ah compliant firms make in response to changes in earnings. Our benchmark 
results show that 37.25% of shocks to net income are absorbed via borrowing and 
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62.27% of shocks are absorbed through investment channels. The results also 
document that borrowing and investment are primary channels in smoothing a large 
amount of fluctuations to the net income.  The amount of shocks (1.3%) left 
unsmoothed is associated with a change in payouts. Our results are consistent with 
the Lambrecht & Myers (2012) budget constraint theory that identifies debt and 
investment as the main mechanisms to smooth volatility in net income. When the 
model is checked to account for a time trend, we find that Shari’ah compliance will 
eventually lead to a fall in the portion of debt and rise in the portion of payout in 
smoothing income, potentially due to higher financial constraints and other burdens 
associated with Shari’ah requirements.  
Both industry-based and total sample estimations validated identical patterns. 
Specifically, we find the magnitude of the Shari’ah effects to be trivial, across most 
of the industries. Consistent with the theory and recent findings, our sectoral 
analysis results indicate that firms become less flexible in smoothing their dividends 
via debt due to the restrictions of SCR. After being Shari’ah compliant, for most of 
the sectors, smoothing patterns of net income by payout changed from negative 
figure to positive by an average of 3%.  
We further analysed a complete assessment of payout smoothing by a joint 
examination of risk sharing and intertemporal smoothing hypotheses. Payout and 
long term income growth correlation has become increasingly significant even more 
when the firms become Shari’ah compliant.  This is quite intuitive since the firms 
would like to become less risky as they have limited ability to borrow loans and 
financial distress is avoidable. Secondly, they are not able to finance payout through 
extra debt after becoming Shari’ah compliant. Lastly, consonant with Darling 
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(1957) and lending support to the permanent income hypothesis, payouts would not 
be decided on short-term income flows but in line with long term income growth. 
Last but not least, aggregate income growth among firms is also correlated with 
payout growth. We found that SC makes firms less capable to leverage and more 
reluctant to adjust the payouts in a reacting against other firms aggregate income 
growth. 
In essay three, we extend the literature on political risk by using a novel 
dataset to evaluate the impact of firm level political risk on implied cost of equity 
and dividend payout policy of firms. Our estimations also include Shari’ah dummy 
variable to account for Shari’ah compliance-specific patterns being reflected in the 
mitigating the frim level political risk. Our study was motivated by the proposition 
that adoption of Shari’ah compliance points to general advantages. A lower-risk 
environment with lower leverage and other screening measures are among these 
advantages. Since firm-level political risk is an avoidable risk, this study provides 
useful insights and some empirical evidence on the political risk in the light of 
Shari’ah equity developments. 
Our benchmark results show that 1% increase in the exposure of political risk 
contributes to a rise in its cost of equity capital by 0.2% and in dividend payout by 
13%. Consistent with the literature, this is due to investors in stock markets 
requiring a premium to compensate them for bearing additional political risk 
(Belkhir, Boubakri & Grira, 2017; Pastor & Veronesi, 2013) and firms facing firm-
level uncertainty try to send positive signal to the markets Huang et al. (2015). 
When the both models are checked to account for Shari’ah compliance, we find that 
Shari’ah compliance will eventually lead to a fall in cost of equity and rise in 
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dividend payouts despite exposure of the firm to political risk.  
We further augmented our models with two-stage regression by including 
some instrumental variables in order to remedy endogeneity. Implied cost of equity 
2SLS models reveal similar coefficients and signs of all variables. The political risk 
and Shari’ah interaction variable reveal negative coefficients on both COE and 
dividend payouts, which reveals that political risk has negative effect on both cost 
of equity and dividend payouts after the Shari’ah compliance announcement.  
Together with providing a novel approach to shed light on recent Islamic 
equity developments, our studies also open up a number of avenues for future 
research. For example, there are some more factors in the variance in firm-level cost 
of equity remains to be explained.  In order to refine our estimates further, other 
factors could be considered (for example differences in regulatory environments and 
personal taxes). By incorporating proxies for other factors in future work, we might 
shed further light on the cost of equity for Shari’ah compliant equities. In addition 
to these factors, model also can be tested by alternative equity valuation models in 
future studies. 
In regard with payout policy study, there are a number of avenues for future 
research. Unexplored relation between managerial compensation and firm payouts 
still remains open. In addition to managerial compensation, tax (both personal and 
corporate) implications on dividend payout is another topic for future study. 
Last but not least, there are also some avenues for future studies with regard 
firm level political risk. One such avenue might be to apply our study to test the 
effect of firm level political risk to other corporate financial indicators such as 
investment, net working capital and etc. 
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Together with specific future avenues for each study, all studies could also be 
extended to investigation of SCR effects across global markets and international 
country-levels. It would be interesting to compare and contrast global trends in the 
corporate response to Shari’ah equity market developments in different regions, 
with varying economic conditions and diverse market structures. Additionally, 
further tests with longer time trend will give opportunity to see behaviour of 
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